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INTRODUCfION

There have been a number of tragic incidents during the past few years
in which mentally unstable teenagers have carried guns into school and
shot teachers and fellow students. For example, on February 19, 1997,
Evan Ramsey, aged sixteen, opened fire in Bethel, Alaska, killing his high
school principal and one of his classmates and wounding two other
students. I On October 1, 1997, Luke Woodham, another sixteen-year-old,
stabbed his mother to death and then killed or wounded nine of his
classmates in Pearl, Mississippi.2 On December 1, 1997, fourteen-year-old
Michael Carneal carried six guns into Heath High School in West Paducah,
Kentucky, where he killed three of his classmates and wounded five
others. 3 On March 24, 1998, a thirteen-year-old boy and an eleven-year-old
boy set off a fire alarm and then calmly opened fire on teachers and
students as they exited from their classrooms at Westside Middle School
in Jonesboro, Arkansas. 4 Four students and one teacher were killed. Two
months later, on May 21, 1998, Kip Kinkel, a fifteen-year-old high school
freshman, killed his parents and then opened fire in a school cafeteria in
Springfield, Oregon, killing two and wounding twenty-two students.s Most
recently, on April 21 , 1999, two high school seniors, Eric Harris and Dylan

1. See Principal, Students Slain; Teen Surrenders, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 20,1997, at 9.
2. See Thomas B. Edsall, Mississippi Boy Held in School Killing Spree, WASH. POST. Oct.
2,1997. at A03.
3. See John Cheves. Do Violent Images Cause Violent Action?, LEXINGTON HERAIDLEADER, May 2, 1999, at AI.
4. See Arkansas Boys Kill Five in Ambush Outside School, ST. LoUIS POST DISPATCH, Mar.
25, 1998, at AI.
5. See Scott Sunde & Steve Miletich, Teen's Rage Turns Deadly, SEATTLE POST
INTEWGENCER. May 22, 1998, at AI.
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Klebold, committed suicide after killing twelve classmates and a teacher
and injuring twenty-three others at Columbine High School in Littleton,
Colorado. 6
These schoolyard killings have generated an intense debate about the
problem of violence in our society. Some social commentators have
attributed teenage violence to the widespread availability of ftrearms,?
while others blame parental neglect, lack of discipline in the schools, or the
declining influence of religion and morality in contemporary culture.
However, another source of concern is the popular media, which stands
accused of purveying sex and violence on a massive scale to
impressionable American youths. Critics point out that action movies, such
as those which feature Arnold Schwarzeneggar, Chuck Norris, Steven
Segal or Jean-Claude Van Damme, continue to flood the market, while
violence on television, both simulated and real, shows no sign of abating
either. And then there are the lyrics of "gangsta" rappers and rock
musicians who specialize in such unsavory topics as street crime, gang
violence, suicide, drug abuse, and sexual perversion. s To make matters
worse, many of the video games that are popular with teenagers also exude
violence.9 Indeed, some of these video games extend beyond the mere
portrayal of violence and actually enable the player to create his own
simulated blood bath. 10 Last, but by no means least, there is pornography

6. See Mark Obmascik, High School Massacre, DENY. POST, May 21, 1999, at AI.
7. According to Barry Krisberg, President of the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency, "[tlhe violence in the media and the easy availability of guns are what's driving the
slaughter of innocents." Richard Lacayo, Toward the Root of the Evil, TIME, Apr. 6, 1998, at 38.
8. See generally Peter A. Block, Modem-Day Sirens: RockLyricsand the FirstAmendment,
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 777,783-85 (1990) (declaring that hate, sex, violence, and suicide are common
threads among the "nihilistic" themes of today's heavy metal music); Michelle Munn, Note, The
Effects of Free Speech: Mass Communication Theory and the Criminal Punishment ofSpeech, 21

AM. J. CRIM. L. 433,476 (1994) (stating that "[rlap artists ... address gang warfare, violence,
poverty, and police brutality in their music, which has become a powerful medium of
communication within the black community").
9. See Anne W. Branscombe, Internet Babylon? Does the Carnegie Mellon Study of
Pornography on the Infonnation Superhighway Reveal a Threat to the Stability of Society?, 83

GEO. LJ. 1935, 1945 (1995) (observing that parents and psychologists are concerned about the
violent material in video games).
10. See David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom ofSpeech. Communicative Torts.
alld the Borderland of the Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REV. 1,32 (1994). For example, in one
video game called Night Trap, masked and hooded figures pursue scantily-clad women and drain
their blood with a gruesome device that constricts their victims' necks. See id. Another popular
game called Mortal Kombat enables the player to control a figure that kills his enemy by ripping
out his spinal cord. See id. Goldell Eye, a game in which the player spends most of his time drawing
a bead on his victims down the barrel of a gun, seems almost benign in comparison. See Lacayo,
supra note 7. These games not only inure players to the effects of violence on others, but, in some
cases, actually teach them how to kill more efficiently. For example, Michael Carneal, coolly fired
his weapon nine times, hitting eight people, five of them in the neck or head, a remarkable feat of
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on the Internet. According to a study by Carnegie Mellon University,
sexually explicit Web sites on the Internet currently offer much more than
just naked ladies; commercial Web sites now routinely depict
sadomasochism, bestiality, child pornography and other forms of outre
behavior. 11
Anecdotal evidence suggests that homicidal teenagers view a great deal
of violent and sexually explicit material and are profoundly influenced by
it. For example, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the killers at Columbine
High School, called themselves the "Trenchcoat Mafia" and dressed in
Gothic-style black coats similar to that worn by Keanu Reeves, a homicidal
character in the movie, Matrix. Michael Carneal, convicted of killing his
classmates at Heath High School, was allegedly influenced to kill by
watching a violent scene from the movie The Basketball Diaries, 12 while
Sarah Edmondson and Ben Darras were inspired to embark on their crime
spree after repeatedly watching a video cassette copy of the movie Natural
Born Killers. 13 In addition, inflammatory lyrics in rap music have allegedly
provoked gang violence and attacks on law enforcement officers. 14 For
example, in one case, Ronald Ray Howard, a 19-year-old auto thief and
gang member, killed a state trooper who had pulled him over for a minor
traffic violation. 15 At his trial, Mr. Howard, a devotee of gangsta rap music,
claimed that he was inspired to kill by listening to rap artist Tupac
Shakur's music. 16 In a somewhat similar fashion, the lyrics of heavy metal
musicians Judas Priestl7 and Ozzie Osbornel 8 allegedly inspired some of
marksmanship for a person who did not have much experience with guns. See John Leo, When Life
Imitates Video, U.S.NEWS&WORIDREP.,May3,1999,at 14. Carneal's impressive marksmanship
might also be attributed to the fact that head shots pay a bonus in many video games. See id.
11. See Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the In/onnation Superhighway: A Survey
0/917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million Times
by Consumers-in Over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces, and Territories, 83 GEO. LJ.
1849, 1889 (1995).
12. See Cheves, supra note 3.
13. See Byers v. Edmondson, 712 So. 2d 681, 684 (Ct. App.), writ error denied, 726 So. 2d
29 (La. 1998), cert. denied, Time Warner Ent. Corp. v. Byers, 526 U.S. 1005 (1999). This movie
was blamed for inspiring at least a dozen "copycat" killings in the United States and Europe. See
Sandra Davidson, BloodMoney: When Media Expose Others to Risk o/Bodily Hann, 19 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. LJ. 225, 238 (1997).
14. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 10, at 63 (declaring that "some record distributors and
gangsta rappers are not merely recklessly indifferent to the risk of violence that they create; they
are aware with crystalline clarity that violent results are predictable").
15. See Munn, supra note 8, at 476-78. The offending lyrics appeared in Mr. Tupac's song
Crooked Ass Nigga. See id. at 477.
16. See id. at 476.
17. See Laura W. Brill, Note, The First Amendment and the Power o/Suggestion: Protecting
"Negligent" Speakers in Cases o/Imitative Hann, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 984,1003 (1994) (discussing
Vancev. Judas Priest, 16 MediaL. Rep. 2241 (Nev. Dist. Ct. 1989»; RobertN. Houser, Comment,
Alleged Inciteful Rock Lyrics-A Look at Legal Censorship and Inapplicability 0/FirstAmendment
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their loyal fans to commit suicide.
Violent video games and pornography also may have encouraged some
individuals to commit acts of violence. For example, the killing spree at
Columbine High School resembled the plot of the video game Postal. 19
According to students at Columbine High School, Eric Harris and Dylan
Klebold were avid players of Doom and Duke Nuke 'Em, while Doom,
Quake, and Mortal Combat were personal favorites of Michael Carneal.20
In addition, an analysis of the data on Michael Carneal's computer revealed
that he frequently visited pornographic Web sites on the Internet.21
The schoolyard violence described above has generated considerable
public pressure to curb the perceived excesses of the popular media. Of
course, the government has been doing just that, without much apparent
success, for more than a hundred years. 22 Recently, however, victims of
teenage violence have enlisted trial lawyers in their fight against sex and
violence in the popular media. For example, in April 1999, the parents of
three students slain by Michael Carneal at Heath High School brought suit
against the producers of the 1995 movie, The Basketball Diaries, and a
number of video game manufacturers and suppliers.23 For good measure,
they also sued the owners of two adult-oriented Internet Web sites.24 In
their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that each of these defendants
contributed to the killings at Heath High School and asked for $30 million
in compensatory damages and $100 million in punitive damages.25 The
case, styled James v. Meow Media,26 is now being tried in a federal district
court in western Kentucky.27

Standards, 17 OHIoN.U. L. REV. 323, 329 (1992) (same).
18. See Waller v. Osborne, 763 F. Supp.ll44(D. Ga. 1991),ajJ'd, 958 F.2d 1084(llthCir.
1992); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
19. See Leo, supra note 10, at 14.
20. See Cheves, supra note 3.
21. See Cheves, supra note 3.
22. See E. Barrett Prettyman & Lisa A. Hook, The Control of Media-Related Imitative
Violence, 38 FED. COM. 8.1. 317, 320 (1987) (pointing out that "[t]or over one hundred years,
individuals, groups and Congress have questioned the role of various media in creating a social
climate conducive to increased violence"); see also Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to
Censor: Freedom of Expression Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society-From Anthony Comstock
to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM. &MARYL. REV. 741 (1992) (describing the history of censorship in the
United States).
23. See Cheves, supra note 3.
24. See Cheves, supra note 3.
25. Complaint, 137, 38, James v. Meow Media, Civil Action No. 5:99 CV 0096-J (W.D. Ky.
Apr. 13, 1999) [hereinafter referred to as "Complaint"].
26. Civil Action No. 5:99 CV oo96-J (W.D. Ky. Apr. 13, 1999). Meow Media is not a
television network for cats; rather, it is a sexually explicit Web site that was frequently visited by
Michael Carneal. See Complaint, '129.
27. The trial court judge granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on April 6, 2000. This
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The complaint alleges that the producers of Basketball Diaries
"fabricated a gratuitous and graphic murder spree" in order to increase the
movie's appeal to younger audiences. 28 According to the plaintiffs, this
scene in the movie, a dream sequence in which the protagonist (played by
Leonardo DiCaprio) massacres his teachers and fellow students at a
Catholic school with a shotgun, inspired Michael Carneal to engage in a
similar rampage at Heath High Schoo1.29 The complaint also alleges that
the defendant video game manufacturers and suppliers distributed "violent
video games which made violence pleasurable and attractive, and
disconnected the violence from the natural consequences thereof, thereby
causing Michael Carneal to act out the violence. ,,30 Furthennore, the
plaintiffs claim that these video games "trained Carneal how to point and
shoot a gun in a fashion making him an extraordinarily effective killer
without teaching him any of the constraints or responsibilities needed to
inhibit such a killing capacity.',Ji
Finally, the complaint alleges thatthe owners oftwo pornographic Web
sites distributed obscene and pornographic material over the Internet which
"served to further attenuate actions from consequences in Carneal's mind,
made virtual sex pleasurable and attractive, provoked violence in Carneal,
and disconnected the violence from the natural consequences thereof,
thereby causing Michael Carneal to act out the violence.'>32 According to
the complaint, Dr. Diane Schetky, an adolescent psychiatrist hired by the
Carneal family to determine whether Michael was mentally ill within the
meaning of the criminal code, concluded that he was "profoundly
influenced by his exposure to the above violent/pornographic media.... ,,33
According to the complaint, Dr. Schetky observed that "[t]he media's
depiction of violence as a means of resolving conflict and a national
culture which tends to glorify violence further condoned his thinking. ,,34
Although the complaint contains a number of negligence claims, the
plaintiffs also rely on seCtion 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts35
as a basis for their claim that each of the defendants manufactured or
distributed a defective product. For example, in Count I of their complaint,
the plaintiffs argue that the so-called "Diaries Defendants,,36 "made and

ruling is currently being appealed. See Memorandum Opinion, James v. Meow Media, 90 F. Supp.
2d 798 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
28. Complaint,113.
29. Seeid.
30. Id.120.
31. Id.121.
32. Id.129.
33. Id.18.
34. Id.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
36. TheDiaries Defendants included Time Warner, Inc., Palm Pictures, Island Pictures, New
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sold a movie in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition which
caused harm to persons other than the users or consumers.'>37 In Count II,
the plaintiffs claim that the various manufacturers and distributors of the
video games, Quake and Doom, known as the "Video Game Defendants,,,38
"made and sold a game in a defective and unreasonably dangerous
condition which caused harm to persons other than users or consumers.',39
The complaint incorporates by reference a similar claim against several
Web site owners, referred to as the "Internet Defendants.,,4o
A victory for the plaintiffs in this litigation will no doubt encourage
others to sue communication and entertainment companies when they are
injured by teenage misfits. If this occurs, it will have' a substantial
economic impact upon these companies and may cause them to reevaluate
the content of the music, movies, and video games that they sell to the
public. While the teenage market is a profitable one,41 the costs of
defending against tort actions will be considerable, and if media defendants
lose these cases, the aggregate effect of multiple compensatory and
punitive damages awards would have a disastrous effect on media
publishers. Increased tort liability will also have a profound and
detrimental effect on society at large. Not only will the costs of paying tort
claims be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices, the prospect
of massive tort liability will discourage artistic expression, particularly in
the movie, television and recording industries.
This Article examines the doctrinal and constitutional barriers that must
be overcome by those who wish to recover from media defendants on a
products liability theory. Part I provides an overview of cases. They are
divided into two major categories: (1) claims arising from a publication's
information content and (2) claims arising from a publication's point of
view or idea content. This latter category can be further subdivided into
cases where media defendants allegedly facilitate the commission of a

Line Cinema and Polygram Film Entertainment Distribution. Inc. See Complaint.llO.
37. Complaint. I 15w.
38. The Video Game Defendants included Midway Home Entertainment. Apogee Software,
Inc .• Id Software. Inc.• Virtus Corp.• Acclaim Entertainment. Inc.• Atari Corp., GT Interactive,
Williams Entertainment. Inc.• Square Soft. Inc., and Sony Computer Entertainment. See id.119.
39. Id.123w.
40. Id. I 26. The Internet Defendants included Meow Media, Inc. and Network
Authentication Systems. Inc. See id.127.
41. United States movie box office sales were $6.95 billion in 1998. The large portion of this
revenue came from the teenage market. See Deborah Claymon, Selling Violence: Link Between
Popular Games and Tragic Events Puts Booming Industry in Conflict. SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
May 9, 1999. Revenue from the sale or licensing of video games came to $6.2 billion in 1998. See
id. Action-oriented video games earned about $1.5 billion during this period. See id. Adult-oriented
Web sites are said to produce about $1 billion a year in revenue. See More Buck/or the Bang,
NEWSWEEK MAG.• Sept. 20, 1999. at 21.
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crime, cases where publishers allegedly induce others to imitate violent
acts that are portrayed in material disseminated to the public, and cases
where they allegedly inspire readers or viewers to commit violent or illegal
acts.
Part II identifies existing doctrinal barriers to product liability claims
against media defendants. For example, plaintiffs who base their claims on
a product liability theory will have to persuade the courts that books,
movies, video games and other information media are products which are
placed in the stream of commerce by their producers. Plaintiffs must also
argue that commercial transactions which enable material to reach the
consuming public should be characterized as sales. Furthermore, plaintiffs
must prove the existence of a defect which makes the "product"
unreasonably dangerous to users or consumers. In addition, regardless of
whether plaintiffs rely on negligence or strict liability principles, they must
prove that the actions of the publisher or the condition of the product have
caused the plaintiffs' injuries. Finally, plaintiffs will have to overcome the
argument that the actions of listeners, viewers, or third parties were not
sufficient to break the chain of causation.
Part ill is concerned with whether media defendants should be allowed
to invoke the protection of the First Amendment in order to shield them
against product liability suits by injured parties. The first issue is whether
the material disseminated by the media qualifies as speech or expression.
Assuming that it does, the next issue is whether such material is protected
speech or whether it falls into a category of unprotected speech, such as
obscenity or incitement to violence. This Article concludes that both
violent and sexually explicit portrayals are legitimate forms of expression
and are, therefore, entitled to full constitutional protection.
Part IV evaluates three liability standards. The first would subject
media publishers to strict liability in tort and deny them First Amendment
protection for sexually explicit expression or expression that inspires
violence or other illegal conduct. The second liability standard would also
foreclose media defendants from claiming First Amendment protection,
but would also require plaintiffs to prove that a publisher was negligent.
The third liability standard, which is similar to the current state of the law,
would essentially prohibit tort actions against media publishers on the basis
of content.
The Article concludes by endorsing this last alternative. There are three
reasons for taking this position. First, a rule that prohibits tort actions
against media defendants would promote artistic expression and media
coverage of mature or controversial subjects. Second, such a rule would
discourage special interest groups from using the tort system as a vehicle
to further their own social agendas. Third, removing media publishers from
the pool of potential defendants will encourage moral leaders to place the
blame where it really belongs-on those who do the actual killing-and

2000J

PRODUCT UABIUTY AND EXPUCrr MATERIAL

611

not allow it to be shifted elsewhere.

1. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CASELAW
Part I introduces a classification system that will be employed later in
this Article.42 According to this taxonomy, tort actions against media
publishers, other than those which involve defamation or invasion of
privacy, can be divided into two basic categories: those based on a .
publication's information content and those based on a publication's idea
content. The first category includes: (1) publications that involve
inaccurate or misleading information, (2) publications that involve
incorrect or incomplete instructions on how to perform a task or operation,
(3) publications that involve advertisements of defective products, and (4)
inaccurate aeronautical charts. The second category includes: (1)
publications that facilitate violent acts, (2) publications that result in
imitative violence, and (3) publications that inspire readers or viewers to
engage in violent behavior.
A. Claims Arising from a Publication's Information Content

The first group of cases involves consumers who have been injured as
the result of relying on information provided by a media publisher. In one
case, the plaintiff sued the publisher of a popular travel guide, claiming
that the defendant incorrectly assured readers that it was safe to body surf
at Kekaha Beach on the island of Kauai in the Hawaiian Islands.43 In
another case, two mushroom pickers brought suit against the publisher of
The Encyclopedia ofMushrooms after ingesting noxious fungi which had
been mistakenly described as edible in the defendant's book.44 The
plaintiffs failed to prevail in these cases because they could not persuade
the courts that the books in question were defective products.45
A second group includes a large number of cases brought by readers
who have been injured while attempting to follow instructions provided in
self-improvement books and instructional guides.46 In one case, an amateur

42. This classification system is loosely based on the work of Professor Sims. See Andrew
B. Sims, Tort Liability for Physical Injuries Allegedly Resulting From Media Speech: A
Comprehensive First Amendment Approach, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 231,235 (1992).
43. See Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publishers, Inc., 833 P.2d 70, 73 (Haw. 1992).
44. See Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
45. See id. at 1036; Birmingham, 833 P.2d at 79.
46. See Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (involving a suit against
publisher by plaintiff who was injured while mixing a mordant according to instructions in
defendant's book, The Complete Metalsmith); see also Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) (involving a claim that author of exotic cookbook should have warned readers that
raw Dasheen root was poisonous); AIm v. Van Nostrand Rheinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1985) (involving a suit by a reader of the defendant's book, The Making of Tools, who was
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cook brought suit against the publishers of the Trade Winds Cookery, a
cookbook which featured exotic ingredients from the tropics. 47 The
plaintiff, who had munched on some raw Dasheen root while preparing a
gourmet meal, alleged that the book failed to warn her that uncooked
Dasheen root was poisonous.48 In another case, a constipated nursing
student sought damages after treating herself to a hydrogen peroxide enema
in accordance with directions provided in the defendant's publication, a
Textbookfor Medical and SurgicalNursing.49 Once again, the plaintiffs in
these cases failed to recover because they based their claims on products
liability theories and were unable to convince the court that the books in
question should be classified as products.50
A third group of cases involve suits by consumers who have been
injured by defective products advertised in the defendant's newspaper or
magazine. In one case, for example, a reader of PopularMechanics sued
the publishers after purchasing defective fireworks advertised in the
defendant's magazine. 5' In another case, a group of irrate investors sued
the Wall Street Journal,claiming that advertisements placed in the Journal
by a Texas mortgage company were false. 52 In yet another case, a woman
brought suit against Seventeen Magazine, alleging that she suffered from
toxic shock syndrome after using Playtex tampons in response to an
advertisement placed in the defendant's magazine by the product's
manufacturer.53 The plaintiffs in these cases lost because the courts
concluded that requiring editors and copywriters to check the truth of such
advertisements would be too great a burden for newspaper and magazine
publishers to bear.54
A fourth group of cases is concerned with claims against the publishers
of aeronautical charts which depict airways, flight procedures, navigation

injured while attempting to make a woodworking tool in accordance with the book's instructions);
Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct. 1981), aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds,
451 N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 1982) (involving a suit by a student who suffered eye injury while
conducting an experiment with rubber bands and ruler as described in fourth-grade science textbook
published by defendant); Young v. Mallett, 371 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975) (alleging that plaintiff was
injured as a result of ingesting excessive amounts of vitamin A, a practice allegedly recommended
in the defendant's nutrition guide, Let's Have Healthy Children); Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123
(Super. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991) (involving a suit by a reader who died of cardiac
failure by following a liquid protein diet described and recommended in defendant's unintentionally
prescient book, The Last Chance Diet).
47. See Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
48. See id.at 1055.
49. See Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Md. 1988).
50. See id. at 1217; Cardozo,342 So. 2d at 1056-57.
51. See Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1974).
52. See Pittman v. Dow Jones, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. La. 1987).
53. See Walters v. Seventeen Magazine, 241 Cal. Rptr. 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
54. See Pittman,662 F. Supp. at 922; Walters, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 103; Yuhas, 322 A.2d at 825.
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and communication radio frequencies, restricted areas, landmarks and
terrain.55 In one case, an insurance company brought an indemnity action
against the publisher of a landing approach chart, claiming that the chart
was defective because the landing profile depicted in the chart was out of
scale with other data represented on the chart.56 Another case involved a
suit against a chart maker by the crew of an airplane that crashed,
contending that some of the data in defendant's instrument approach chart
was misleading. 7 For the most part, these suits have been successful. 8 In
contrast to other defective information cases, the courts in the aeronautical
chart cases have almost always accepted the argument that inaccurate
aeronautical charts are defective products. 9
B. ClaimsArisingfrom a Publication's
Point of View or Idea Content
This category includes cases in which publishers either facilitate the
commission of a crime, induce others to imitate violent acts that are
portrayed, or inspire readers or viewers to commit violent acts.
1. Facilitation Cases
Those who bring lawsuits based on a facilitation rationale claim that the
defendant increased the risk of criminal attack by publishing information
about a crime victim or witness before the suspect has been taken into
custody, publishing instructions on how to commit a crime, or publishing
"gun-for-hire" advertisements.6 Hyde v. City of Columbia,61 Times Mirror

55. See Robert B. Schultz, Application of Strict ProductsLiability to AeronauticalChart
Publishers,64 J. AIR L. & COM. 431,434 (1999). There are three types of charts: en route charts,
area charts and approach charts. See David L. Abney, Liabilityfor Defective AeronauticalCharts,
52 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 323, 324 (1986). En route charts show flight paths and airways across a large
area. See id. Area charts show airways around major metropolitan area. Approach charts depict
runway approach paths. See id.
56. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppeson, 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Saloomey
v. Jeppeson & Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983) (alleging that approach chart was defective).
57. See Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Fluor Corp. v.
Jeppeson & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (claiming that a mistake in defendant's
instrument approach chart caused plane crash).
58. The one exception is Times MirrorCo. v. Sisk, 593 P.2d 924 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978),
brought by the crew of a cargo jet which crashed into a mountain while attempting to land at an
airport in the Philippines. However, in that case it was undisputed that the pilot was off course and
was flying at the wrong elevation when the crash occurred. See id. at 927.
59. See Brocklesby, 767 F.2d at 1295; Aetna Casualty,642 F.2d at 342.
60. See Sims, supra note 42, at 249.
61. 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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Co. v. Superior Court,62 and Risenhoover v. England63 are illustrative of
the first subcategory. In Hyde, a kidnapping victim brought a successful
action against a newspaper for disclosing her name to the public while her
abductor was still at large. 64 In Times Mirror,a California court upheld an
invasion of privacy claim by a murder witness against a newspaper which
had published her name while the murderer was still free.65 In Risenhoover,
it was alleged that newspaper and television stations, having discovered
that federal authorities were about to raid the headquarters of the infamous
David Koresh, sent news teams out to the compound, thereby alerting
Koresh, and allegedly causing the plaintiffs' deaths in the ensuing gun
battle.' I several of these cases, the plaintiff prevailed, notwithstanding
claims by the defendants that they were merely exercising their First
Amendment rights.67
Another type of facilitation case involves the publication of explicit
instructions on how to commit an illegal act. The leading example of this
genreis Rice v. PaladinEnterprises,Inc.6" In Rice, murder victims brought
suit against the publisher of a "hit man" instruction book.69 In that case, the
court exhibited no qualms about imposing liability after the defendant
unwisely admitted that it had published its manual for the express purpose
of training aspiring criminals.7"
The last group of facilitation cases involve "gun-for-hire"
advertisements.71 They include Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine,
Inc.,72 Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc. 73 and Norwood v.
Soldierof FortuneMagazine,Inc.74 Eimann involved a suit against Soldier
of Fortune Magazine by the wife who was injured by a hit man hired by
her husband to kill her.75 The husband had contacted the hit man through
an "employment wanted" advertisement published in Soldier of Fortune
Magazine.7 6 In Braun, the suit was brought by sons of a parent who was
murdered by a hit man hired through an advertisement placed in Soldierof

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

244 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
936 F. Supp. 392 (W.D. Tex. 1996).
Hyde, 637 S.W.2d at 25..
Times Mirror,244 Cal. Rptr. at 559, 560.
Risenhoover, 936 F. Supp. at 396.
See id. at 405; Times Mirror,244 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1515 (1998).
Id. at 241.
Id. at 265.
See Crump, supra note 10, at 23-25.
880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989).
968 F.2d 1110 (11 th Cir. 1992).
651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
Eimann, 880 F.2d at 832.
See id.
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Fortune.77 In Norwood, the injured victim of a failed murder-for-hire
assignment sued Soldier of Fortune for providing assistance to
unemployed thugs and mercenaries. 78 The results in these "gun-for-hire"
cases have been mixed. On one hand, the court in Eimann declared that the
advertisement was so ambiguous that the magazine's publisher could not
reasonably have known of the hit man's criminal intent.79 On the other
hand, the court in Braun concluded that the publisher should have known
that the advertiser was offering to commit a murder.8 " The court in
Norwood also held that the publisher could be held liable for any
foreseeable harm to the plaintiff.8
2. Imitation Cases
These cases arise when a viewer deliberately tries to imitate a
dangerous or illegal activity that is depicted in material of the defendant.
For example, two teenagers, imitating a scene from the movie, The
Program, lay down on a highway at night and, not surprisingly, were
struck by a passing car.' In DeFilippo v. NBC, 3 a thirteen-year old boy
accidently hanged himself while imitating a stunt that he had observed on
television.84 In Herceg v. Hustler Magazine,Inc.," an oversexed teenager
also inadvertently hanged himself while performing an exercise involving
masturbation and asphyxiation8 6 This particular autoerotic episode was
inspired by an article in Hustler Magazine aptly entitled "Orgasm of
Death. 8 ' The victim in Sakon v. Pepsico,Inc."8 injured himself in a more
prosaic fashion while engaged in "lakejumping," an activity that appeared
in various television commercials for the soft drink Mountain Dew.8 9
Finally, in Olivia N. v. NationalBroadcastingSystem, 9° a young girl, was
"artificially raped" at a public beach by a gang of vicious teenagers who

77. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1112.

78. Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at 1397-98.
79. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 834.
80. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1121.
81. Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at 1403.
82. See Mike Quinlan &Jim Persels, It'sNot My Fault, the Devil Made MeDo lt:
Attempting
to Impose Tort Liability on Publishers,Producers,andArtistsfor InjuriesAllegedly "Inspired"
by Media Speech, 18 S. IXL. U. L.J. 417,419 (1994).
83. 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982).
84. Id. at 1038.
85. 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
86. See id.
87. See id. at 803.
88. 553 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1989).
89. Id. at 164.
90. 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), cert.denied sub nom. Niemi v. National Broad.
Co., 458 U.S. 1108 (1982).
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had recently observed a similar event portrayed on television. 91 In each of
these cases, the defendant successfully argued that its actions should be
protected by the First Amendment.92
3. Inspiration Cases
In some cases, the plaintiffs have alleged that depictions of violence
encouraged or inspired listeners and viewers to commit violent acts against
themselves or others.93 In one case, Weirum v. RKO General,Inc.," a radio
station offered a prize to the first person to locate its peripatetic disc
jockey, "the Real Don Steele." Unfortunately, the plaintiff was killed when
his car was run off the road by some inattentive teenagers who were
pursuing the elusive Mr. Steele. 95 The court upheld the plaintiff's claim,
reasoning that the radio station could have foreseen reckless driving by
some contestants and, consequently, should have refrained from
sponsoring such a dangerous event. 96

Other litigants, however, have not been so successful. For example, in
Bill v. Superior Court,97 an innocent bystander was shot outside a theater
where the gang-related movie, BoulevardNights, was being shown.9" The
plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that the producers of the film knew that
such a movie would attract people who were inclined toward violent
conduct, and therefore, should have protected theater patrons and
bystanders against criminal attacks. 99
In Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System,"° a teenage scofflaw
sued a number of television ndtworks, claiming that he had become
involuntarily hooked on television violence and had shot and killed his 83year-old neighbor while so addicted."' The plaintiffs contention,
apparently, was that he would have eschewed a life of crime if only the
television networks had not broadcast so much violent programming102
The court was not very impressed with this theory and summarily
dismissed the case. 0 3 In another case, Yakubowicz v. ParamountPictures
91. See id. at 891 (explaining what it means to be "artificially raped").
92. See Herceg, 565 F. Supp. at 805; Olivia N., 178 Cal. Rptr. at 893; Sakon, 553 So. 2d at
166; DeFilippo,446 A.2d at 1042.
93. See Sims, supra note 42, at 239-43.
94. 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
95. See id. at 38-39.
96. See id. at 40-42.
97. 187 Cal. Rptr. 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
98. See id. at 626-27.
99. See id. at 628.
100. 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
101. See id. at 200.
102. Seeid. at201.
103. See id. at 200.
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Corp., ° the parents of a young girl who was knifed to death sued the
producers of the gang film, The Warriors,claiming that the movie incited
viewers to commit violence.105 A Massachusetts court, however,
determined that the film did not advocate violence or encourage viewers
to engage in illegal conduct.'06
108
Finally, two cases, McCollum v. CBS, Inc.17 and Waller v. Osborne,
were brought by parents of emotionally disturbed teenagers who were
allegedly induced to commit suicide by the lyrics of Ozzy Osborne's
music."°9 In McCollum, a nineteen-year-old fan, shot and killed himself
while listening to Osborne's music. 110 A similar incident occurred in the
Waller case."' In each instance, the court refused to hold Osborne liable
because he did not directly incite his listeners to commit suicide."' The
victim in Byers v. Edmondson"' was one of several individuals attacked
by viewers of the film, NaturalBorn Killers. 14 In that case, two teenage
psychopaths, after repeatedly viewing a videotape of the film, went on a
crime spree, shooting the plaintiff during the attempted robbery of a
convenience store." 5 The plaintiff brought suit against producers of the
film, claiming that they intended to cause viewers to imitate the violent
conduct of the movie's main characters. 16 A state appeals court allowed
the plaintiff to try to prove that the producers actually intended for viewers
to commit violent crimes. 117
In sum, courts are reluctant to subject the publishers of non-defamatory
material to tort liability despite claims by plaintiffs that these materials
have directly caused physical harm. When plaintiffs allege that the
publication is a defective product, the courts tend to analyze these claim in
terms of conventional tort doctrine. Although First Amendment issues
often lurk in the background, they are seldom addressed explicitly. On the

104. 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989).
105. See id. at 1068. This was just one of many acts of violence perpetrated by teenaged
viewers of The Warriors.See Sims, supra note 42, at 247.
106. 536 N,E.2d at 1071; see also Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding
that the publishers of the board game Dungeonsand Dragons was not liable for the suicide of a

teenager).
107. 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
108. 763 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Ga.), af'd, 958 F.2d 1084 (11 th Cir. 1991).
109. See Weller, 763 F. Supp. at 1145; McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
110. See McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
111. See Weller, 763 F. Supp. at 1145.
112. See id. at 1152; McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
113. 712 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1143 (1999).
114. See id. at 683-84; see also Davidson, supranote 13, at 238 (observing that this movie had
been blamed for about a dozen killings in the United States and Europe).
115. See Byers, 712 So. 2d at 684.
116. Seeid.at687.
117. See id. at 688.

FWRIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 52

other hand, where plaintiffs allege negligence on the part of the publisher,
the courts are more likely to resolve the case on First Amendment grounds.
I. DOCTRINAL ISSUES
In the past, claims against media publishers were usually based upon
such legal theories as negligent publication, failure to warn, or negligent
misrepresentation. Now, plaintiffs commonly rely upon principles of strict
products liability as well. However, as we shall see below, there are serious
doctrinal problems with treating publishers as sellers of defective products.
A. TraditionalLiability Theories
The traditional liability theories are negligent publication, failure to
warn, and negligent misrepresentation. Each of these theories requires the
plaintiff to prove that his or her injury was caused by some sort of culpable
conduct on the part of the publisher.
1. Negligent Publication
"Negligent publication" involves the publication of information that
results in physical harm to another. In one group of cases, plaintiffs
claimed that media defendants subjected them to the risk of criminal attack
by publishing information about a crime victim or witness before the
suspect had been taken into custody. For example, in Hyde v. City of
Columbia,"8 'the victim of an abduction brought a negligent publication
action against a newspaper for disclosing her name to the public despite the
fact her abductor was still at large." 9 Citing section 449 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts,' 20 the court declared that the newspaper had a duty to
protect the plaintiff against the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties.''
In Risenhooverv. England, 22 when local newspaper and television stations
found out that federal agents were planning to raid the headquarters of cult
leader, David Koresh, they sent news teams out to the Branch Davidian
compound, thereby alerting Koresh to the fact that a raid was imminent.'23
The court allowed a negligent publication suit by law enforcement officers
killed in the ensuing gun battle to go to trial. 24
The negligent publication theory was also used in some of the "gun for

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
See id. at 253.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTs § 449 (1969).
Hyde, 637 S.W.2d at 253.
936 F. Supp. 392 (W.D. Tex. 1996).
See id. at 400-403.
See id. at 405.
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hire" cases. Eimann v. Soldierof FortuneMagazine, Inc., 25 for example,
involved a negligent publication suit against SoldierofFortuneMagazine
by a wife who was shot by a hit man hired by her husband.12 6 The plaintiff
claimed that the publisher should have known that the advertiser was
seeking employment as a hit man and, therefore, should have refused to
publish the ad.'2 7 The court, however, determined that the advertisement
was so ambiguous that the publisher could not have discovered its criminal
purpose merely by reading it."12 However, in Braun v. Soldier of Fortune
Magazine, Inc.,' 29 another negligent publication case, the court concluded
that a similar advertisement was clear enough to alert the publisher to the
fact that the advertiser was offering to perform criminal acts. 30
2. Failure to Warn
Some plaintiffs have argued that media defendants owe an affirmative
duty to warn that information contained in their publications might not be
accurate or that certain activities described in their publication involve
inherent risks.' A failure to warn claim is narrower than a negligent
publication claim because the plaintiff does not seek to hold the defendant
liable for publishing particular information, but only for failing to warn
about the risks associated with its publication. Even so, this theory has
found little favor with the courts. For example, in Cardozo v. True, 3 2 the
plaintiff brought suit against a retail seller of a cookbook which featured
unusual ingredients from the tropics. The plaintiff was injured when she
ate a bit of uncooked Dasheen root while preparing a meal and became
seriously ill."'33 According to the plaintiff, the bookstore owner should have
warned her that raw Dasheen root could be poisonous.1'" While conceding
that the author of the cookbook might have been negligent, the court
concluded that it would be unreasonable to impose a duty on retail sellers
35
to warn customers about possible mistakes in the books they sold.

125. 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989).
126. See id. at 831-32.
127. See id. at 833.
128. See id. at 834.

129. 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992).
130. See id. at1121.
131. See Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Cardozo v.

True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Pubs., Inc., 833
P.2d 70 (Haw. 1992); Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981), aff'd in part &
rev'd in part on other grounds, 451 N.Y.S. 533 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Way v. Boy Scouts of Am.,
856 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
132. 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
133. See id. at 1055.
134. See id.

135. See id. at 1057.
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The Supreme Court of Hawaii reached a similar conclusion with respect
to publishers in Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publishers,Inc.136 In that
case, the plaintiff contended that the defendant's travel book should have
warned its readers that it was not safe to body surf in the waters off of
Kehaha Beach in Hawaii. The court, however, rejected the plaintiff's
claim, concluding that imposing such a duty would require a book
publisher to independently verify the accuracy of every statement in the
books it published.'37 According to the court, such a burden would be an
unreasonable one for the publishing industry.'38
3. Negligent Misrepresentation
Some plaintiffs have relied upon the concept of negligent
misrepresentation in order to recover against media publishers. In order to
recover damages under a negligent misrepresentation theory, the injured
party must establish that: (1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to
disclose the true facts; (2) the defendant negligently misrepresented a
material fact; (3) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the defendant's
misrepresentation; and (4) an actual loss resulted from this reliance.'39
Most of the negligent misrepresentation cases have been concerned with
pecuniary losses,14° but at least one, Alm v. Van NostrandRheinholdCo.,"4'
involved physical injuries. The Alm case involved a suit against the
publisher of a book entitled The Making of Tools by a reader who was
injured while attempting to make a woodworking tool according to the
book's instructions. 142 The court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to
136. 833 P.2d 70 (Haw. 1992).
137. See id. at 76.
138. See id.
139. See Steven J. Weingarten, Note, Tort Liabilityfor Nonlibelous Negligent Statements:
FirstAmendment Considerations,93 YAL L.J. 744,754 (1984). It should be noted, however, that
a number of states limit negligent misrepresentation suits to claims involving economic loss and
exclude negligent misrepresentation suits based on personal injury claims. See, e.g., Daniel M.
Lane, Jr., Note, PublisherLiabilityforMaterialthat InvitesReliance, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1155, 1182
(1988).
140. See Barden v. Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 41, 42-45 (D. Mass. 1994)
(refusing to impose liability on publisher of book which allegedly misrepresented an attorney's
qualifications to handle child abuse cases); see also Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F.
Supp. 990, 992 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting summary judgment for publisher of chemical
encyclopedia who misrepresented the toxicity of germ-killing chemical produced by plaintiff for
use in hospitals); Roman v. New York, 442 N.Y.S.2d 945,947-48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (dismissing
negligent misrepresentation suit against Planned Parenthood alleging that it provided inaccurate
information about contraception methods in one of its pamphlets); Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490
N.E.2d 898, 902 (Ohio 1986) (upholding dismissal of negligent misrepresentation claim against
financial newspaper for investment losses).
141. 480 N.E.2d 1263 (II1. Ct. App. 1985).
142. See id. at 1264.
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make out a negligent misrepresentation claim and also expressed concern
about the chilling effect misrepresentation 4 claims
might have on the
3
recognized.
were
they
if
industry
publishing
B. Strict ProductsLiability
None of these negligence-based theories are especially helpful to
plaintiffs, because they all require the plaintiff to establish that the
publisher failed to exercise due care. Consequently, in recent years, injured
parties have begun to base their claims to compensation on a strict liability
theory instead of negligence. Strict liability in tort does not require the
plaintiff to prove that the producer or seller of a defective product was in
any way at fault.'" According to traditional principles of strict liability,
however, there must be both a product and a sale. In addition, the product
involved must be defective in some way and this defect must be the causein-fact of the plaintiff's injury. Finally, harm that occurred must be
foreseeable, and the product seller must have a duty to protect the plaintiff
against it. Thus, the doctrinal issues that may arise under a strict products
liability theory include: (1) what is a product? (2) what kinds of
transactions are subject to strict liability? and (3) what makes a product
defective? In addition, a products liability case will also involve garden
variety causation and proximate cause issues, just as a negligence case
would.
1. The Product Requirement
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A declares that "[o]ne who
sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to [strict] liability."' 45 Its
successor, the Third Restatement of Torts, provides that "[o]ne... who
sells or distributes a defective product is subject to [strict] liability for
harms to person or property caused by the defect." 4 6 Under either of these
formulations both a product and sale (or sale-like transaction) are required
in order to subject the seller to strict liability. It should be noted, however,
that there is considerable overlap between the "product" requirement and
the "sale" requirement. Thus, in determining whether strict liability is an
appropriate liability standard to employ in a particular case, some courts
emphasize the product issue, while others focus on the nature of the

143. See id. at 1267.
144. See Schultz, supranote 55, at 433 (observing that [t]he doctrine of strict product liability
eliminates the plaintiffs need to prove the fault or culpable conduct of the defendant manufacturer

or seller").
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 402A (1965).
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998).
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According to generally accepted doctrine, strict liability is applicable
only to an injury that is caused by a defective "product."' 48 This term was
not explicitly defined in section 402A, although the drafters of the Second
Restatement placed that section in a chapter entitled "Suppliers of
Chattels."' 49 Since chattels are defined as a species of property that are
tangible and movable, 0 one could infer that the drafters intended section
402A to apply only to the sale of such goods. The Third Restatement also
appears to require that a product be tangible because it defines it as
"tangible personal property distributed commercially for use or
consumption."' 51 Many courts t52 and commentators, 153 however, have
147. See Gary T. Walker, The ExpandingApplicability of Strict Liability Principles:How Is
a "Product"Defined?, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 4 (1986) (observing that "the Restatement phrase
'sells any product' may be divided into: (1) a product analysis which centers on whether the article
should be viewed as a product; and (2) a transaction analysis which examines whether a given
transaction involves the sale of a product or the rendering of a service"); see alsoJohn C. Wunsch,
The Definition of a Productfor the Purposesof Section 402A, 50 INS. COUNS. J. 344, 345 (1983)
(declaring that "a distinction must be made between aproductanalysis,which focuses on whether
a given good should be characterized as a product, and a transactionanalysis, which focuses on
whether a given transaction involves the sale of a product or the rendering of a service").
148. See Lars Noah, Authors, Publishers,and ProductsLiability: Remedies for Defective
Information in Books, 77 OR. L. REV. 1195, 1203 (1998).
149. See Susan Lanoue, Comment, ComputerSoftware andStrict ProductsLiability, 20 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 439,444-45 (1989).
150. See Castle v. Castle, 267 F. 521,522-23 (9th Cir. 1920) (citing Blackstone's definition
of chattels as property that is capable of being moved from place to place).
151. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTs LIABILITY § 19 (1998). A number of state
statutes also define "product" in terms of tangibility or movability. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16116-102(2) (Michie 1987) (defining "product" as any tangible object or goods); IDAHO CODE § 61302(3) (Michie 1998) (stating that a product must possess intrinsic value, must be capable of
delivery, and must be produced for commercial purposes).
152. See Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 654 P.2d 343, 350 (Haw. 1982) (citing public
policy considerations as the basis finding a prefabricated commercial building to be a product); see
also Lowrie v. City of Evanston, 365 N.E.2d 923,928 (II. Ct. App. 1977) (concluding on public
policy grounds that a municipal garage was a product); Papp v. Rocky Mountain Oil & Minerals,
769 P.2d 1249, 1253-56 (Mont. 1989) (finding that public policy did not support the conclusion
that an oil separator facility was a product).
153. See Roy W. Arnold, Note, The Persistenceof CaveatEmptor: Publisherlmmunityfrom
Liabilityfor Inaccurate FactualInformation, 53 U. PITr. L. REV. 777, 781-82 (1992) (declaring
that "[i]nstead of relying on the tangible-intangible distinction invoked by some courts, a more
modem approach to the product issue would examine the policies underlying products liability");
see also Andrew T. Bayman, Comment, Strict Liability for Defective Ideas in Publications,42
VAND. L. REV. 557, 562 (1989) (stating that "[t]he most popular approach is to define the 'sale of
a product' for purposes of section 402A entirely in terms of the social policy justifications for the
imposition of strict liability"); James P. Maloney, Note, What Is or Is Not a Product Within the
Meaning of Section 402A, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 627 (1974) (concluding that "[u]Itimately both
the definition of product and sale can be determined only with reference to . . . policy
justifications"). But see AnitaBenstein, How Can a ProductBeLiable?,45 DUKEL.J. 1,54 (1995)
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rejected tangibility as an essential criterion, and instead look to see whether
subjecting the seller to strict liability will promote accident cost avoidance,
risk-spreading, or other policies associated with modem products liability
law.
For the most part, the courts have refused to classify information as a
product.'54 In Jones v. J.B. LippincottCo.,' for example, a nursing student
treated her constipation problem with a hydrogen peroxide enema in
accordance with directions printed in the defendant's medical textbook.'56
This potent concoction proved to be quite harmful and the unhappy
plaintiff brought a product liability claim against the book's publisher.'57
The plaintiff contended that textbooks should be treated like aeronautical
charts, which were subject to strict liability. However, the court rejected
this analogy and concluded strict liability was not appropriate because of
the chilling effect it might have on book publishers.' In Smith v. Linn, 59
the plaintiff attempted to lose weight by following the dictates of liquid
protein diet as set forth in the defendant's book, The Last Chance Diet."W
Although the diet was at first successful, she eventually died of cardiac
failure allegedly caused by the diet. 6 ' The plaintiff in Smith also invoked
the analogy of the navigational chart to argue that the diet book should be
treated as a product, subject to strict liability. However, the court,
apparently concerned with the potential effect of publisher liability on free
speech, concluded that a diet book did not resemble an aeronautical chart
and refused to hold the publisher to a strict liability standard.' 62
In Winter v. G.P.Putnam'sSons,163 two mushroom pickers relied on the
defendant's book, The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms, to enable them
determine which mushrooms were poisonous and which were safe to eat.
According to the plaintiffs, the Encyclopedia mistakenly identified one of

(arguing that "symbolic interactionism suggests that a product must be capable of existence in

tangible, material form").
154. See Jonathan B. Mintz, Strict Liabilityfor Commercial Intellect, 41 CATH. U. L. REV.
617, 617 (1992) (stating that "[c]ourts have almost uniformly refused to classify written words or
an idea as a 'product' for purposes of imposing the various forms of products liability"); see also
Davidson, supra note 13, at 257 (stating that "attempts to treat the printed contents of magazines,
newspapers, or books as products have failed"); Lane, supra note 139, at 1176 (contending that
"courts usually refuse to recognize publications as a product for strict liability purposes").
155. 694 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Md. 1988).
156. See id. at 1216.
157. See id. at 1217.
158. See id.
159. 563 A.2d 123 (Super. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991).
160. See id. at 124.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 127.
163. 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
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the most virulent species of mushroom as perfectly edible.164 The plaintiffs
were seriously injured when they consumed one of these mushrooms,
thinking that it was safe to eat. In their suit against the Encyclopedia's
publisher, the plaintiffs argued that instructional books were products and,
like navigation charts, should be subject to strict liability in tort. The court,
however, declared that products liability should be limited to tangible
objects and that the "pure thought and expression" contained in the
Encyclopedia should not be subject to this sort of liability. 165 Finally, the
publisher of aboard game version of Dungeons andDragonswas accused
in Watters v. TSR, Inc. ' of contributing to a teenage boy's suicide. 67 The
appeals
claim was based on strict products liability. However, a federal
68
court refused to apply strict liability to words or pictures.1
For some inexplicable reason, aeronautical charts, although they
contain printed information like books and magazines, are treated
differently by the courts.169 Thus, in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Jeppeson,"7 a federal appeals court held that a chart was a defective
product because the landing profile depicted in the chart was out of scale
with the other data represented on the chart. 7 ' In Saloomey v. Jeppeson &
Co., 72 the court distinguished between architectural plans which were
supplied pursuant to a professional service contract, and charts which were
mass-produced and marketed by map publishers; the latter were considered
to be products and the publisher could properly be held strictly liable for
any inaccuracies in the chart.'73 In Brocklesby v. United States,74 the court
held the chart-maker strictly liable even though it merely republished
procedures developed by the government.' 75 Finally, in Fluor Corp. v.
Jeppeson& Co.,176 a California intermediate appellate court concluded that
from the
a chart-maker could be held strictly liable where an omission
77
defendant's instrument approach chart caused a plane crash. 1
Frankly, it is difficult to see how an aeronautical chart is so different
from a book that the former item can be classified as a product while the

164. See id. at 1034.
165. Id. at 1036.

166. 904 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1990).
167. See id. at 379.
168. See id. at 381.

169. See Abney, supra note 55, at 350; Schultz, supra note 55, at 43 1.
170. 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981).
171. See id. at 344.

172. 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).
173. See id. at 677.
174. 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986).
175. See id. at 1295.

176. 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
177. See id. at 72.
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latter is not.'78 Both are mass-produced for a general market. Consumers
purchase both charts and books to obtain the information contained therein
and these publications have little utility or value aside from their
informational content.179 It seems, therefore, that these cases can be
dismissed as aberrations. Aside from the aeronautical chart cases, the
overwhelming body of case law supports the notion that the information
and idea content of printed materials is not a product."8 ' At the present
time, the courts have not ruled on whether records, movies, video games
or Web sites should be considered to be products for purposes of tort
liability. However, these media share the same characteristics as books and
magazines, that is, they are tangible objects (in most cases), but their
principal function is to serve as vehicles for the distribution of ideas and
information. Thus, the same reasoning that has led courts to conclude that
books and magazines are not products should also lead them to conclude
that records, movies, video games and Web sites are not products either.
C. The Sale Requirement
Both versions of the Restatement require the "sale" of a product as a
prerequisite for strict liability.'' Pure services, on the other hand, are
ordinarily not subject to a rule of strict liability.8 2 For purposes of this rule,

178. Commentators have not found these judicial attempts to distinguish between books and
charts very persuasive. See Noah, supranote 148, at 1195 (declaring that, "This distinction makes
little sense, however, because purchasers read and rely on the information in such charts in much
the same way that they use the instructions in mass-produced textbooks, cookbooks, field guides,
and similar 'How to' manuals...
."); Schultz, supra note 55, at 446 (contending that "a book of

aeronautical charts is no more like a compass than a book of mushrooms is like a pot").
179. See Bayman, supra note 153, at 573 (arguing that aeronautical charts "are similar to
books because a consumer is purchasing the charts to obtain the information contained therein, not
the charts themselves").
180. See John L. Diamond & James L. Primm, Rediscovering TraditionalTort Typologies to
Determine Media Liability for Physical Injuries: From the Mickey Mouse Club to Hustler

Magazine, 10 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 969, 983 (1988) (arguing that maps are more like
services than products and, therefore, should not be subject to strict liability).
181. Section 402A declares that "[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to [strict] liability."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OFTORTS § 402A (1965). The Third Restatement of Torts provides that
"[o]ne ...who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to [strict] liability for harms to
person or property caused by the defect." RESTATEMENT THIRD, TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrY § 1
(1998).
182. See Mintz, supranote 154, at 630 (stating that "[s]ervices cannot be the basis for a strict
products liability claim"); see also William C. Powers, Jr., DistinguishingBetween Productsand
Services in Strict Liability,62 N.C. L. REV. 415,419 (1984) (declaring that "nearly all courts have
refused to extend strict products liability to pure service transactions"). But see Jon Chait, Note,
Continuing the Common Law Response to the New IndustrialState: The Extension of Enterprise

Liabilityto ConsumerServices,22 UCLAL. REV. 401,412 (1974) (arguing on economic efficiency
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a pure sale is a transaction solely devoted to the purchase of a tangible
object.18 3 In contrast, a pure service transaction involves the exercise of
reasonable care, competence and skill in the performance of a particular
task." 4 In addition, the performance of a service typically involves direct
contact between the service provider and the ultimate consumer.8 5
Commentators have offered various reasons for applying a negligence
standard to services, rather than strict liability. First, service providers are
not able to spread losses as effectively as product sellers; 186 second,
because there are no middlemen, injured parties can easily determine who
is responsible for service-related injuries; 87 third, services are not massproduced, but are unique to each customer; 188 and finally, consumers
expect a greater degree of consistency and reliability when they buy a
product than when they employ someone to perform a service.' 89
Most of the controversy in this area involves hybrid transactions rather
than pure sales or services. A hybrid transaction is one in which the service
provider provides a product during the course of performing a service."
Since a hybrid transaction contains elements of both a sale and a service,
the problem is to determine which aspect predominates. 191 The most

grounds that pure services should be subject to strict liability).
183. See Dana Shelhimer, Comment, Sales-Service Hybrid Transactions and the Strict
Liability Dilemma, 43 SW. L.J. 785, 790 (1989) (concluding that "[a] pure sale transaction occurs
when the sole purpose of the transaction is to purchase a product").
184. See James B. Sales, The Service-Sales Transaction:A Citadel UnderAssault, 10 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 13, 18 (1978) (contending that "[t]he very essence of a transaction involving the
service provider is the performance of a particular service with reasonable care, competence, and
skill').
185. See Mintz, supranote 154, at 630 (arguing that "[i]n order for a transaction to qualify as
a service, there must be some personal or direct interaction with the consumer").
186. See John Riper, Note, StrictLiability in Hybrid Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 391,396 (1980)
(pointing out that "[tihe lack of substantial assets and the small pool of customers limit the
servicer's ability to spread the costs of liability, and make it afar poorer risk-spreader than the seller
of goods").
187. See Powers, supra note 182, at 429 (observing that "the special obstacles of proof
encountered by plaintiffs in products cases are not as acute in service cases").
188. See Charles Cantu, The Illusive Meaning of the Term "Product" UnderSection 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 635, 640 (1991) (contending that "services
are not mass-produced, but rather they are rendered to the person requesting them; therefore, the
policy reasons for strict liability do not apply").
189. See Riper, supra note 186, at 397 (stating that "[w]hile purchasers of goods expect a
product free of defects, hirers of services normally contract for the services of an expert rather than
for a particular result").
190. See Wunsch, supra note 147, at 357 (declaring that "[h]ybrid transactions... involv[e]
both the sale of a good and the rendition of a service"); see also Susan Lanoue, Comment,
ComputerSoftware and StrictProductsLiability,20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 439,453 (1983) (defining
a hybrid transaction as one which involves both the sale of a product and a service).
191. See Mintz, supra note 154, at 631-32.
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popular approaches are the essence test, the predominate factor test, the
source-of-the-defect test, and the stream of commerce test. The essence of
the transaction test, which was originally concerned with whether a
transaction fell within the Statute of Frauds,' 92 examines the essential
element of the transaction to see whether it resembles a service or a sale.93
A closely-related approach, the predominant factor test, focuses on the
parties' motivation for entering into the transaction. If the defendant's
knowledge, expertise or reputation is the primary motivating factor, the
transaction will be treated as a service; however, if this consideration is
merely incidental, the transaction will be characterized as a sale.' 94 Some
courts employ a source-of-the-defect test: if the injury is caused by a
defective product, strict liability applies, but if the injury results from lack
of due care with respect to the service component of the hybrid transaction,
the plaintiff's suit must be for negligence. 5 Finally, under the. stream of
commerce test, strict liability is applied if the transaction is considered to
be a commercial in nature, but a transaction that occurs 9in6 the context of
a professional relationship is considered to be a service.
So far, the sale-service issue has only arisen in one media publisher
case, Appleby v. Miller.97 In Miller, a dental patient unsuccessfully sued
the publisher of a medical history intake form which failed to inquire
adequately about the patient's physical and medical condition.198 There are
a number of potentially serious problems with the sale/service distinction
in media publisher cases. One problem is that some modem marketing
practices involve transactions that cannot be described as either sales or
services in the traditional sense. The other problem is that consumers are
exposed to the information and ideas by means transactions that may be
characterized as services in one context and sales in another.

192. See William R. Russell, Note, ProductsandtheProfessional:StrictLiabilityin theSalesService Hybrid Transaction, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 111, 113 (1972). This approach looked to see
whether or not the defendant's efforts produced tangible goods which could be bought and sold.
See id. at 114.
193. See Riper, supra note 186, at 399-402; see also Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960
(8th Cir. 1974); Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Assocs., 102 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1972); G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392,394 (Tex. 1982).
194. See Cantu, supra note 188, at 643-44.; see also Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 225
Cal. Rptr. 595, 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 441 (Md.
1983); Trujillo v. Berry, 738 P.2d 1331, 1334 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987).
195. See Riper, supranote 186, at 402-04; see also Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 528
P.2d 76 (Or. 1974); Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex. 1968).
196. See Shelhimer, supra note 183, at 812; see also Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 258 A.2d
697,702 (NJ. 1966). But see Steve Brook, Comment, Sales-Service HybridTransactions:A Policy
Approach, 28 Sw. L.J. 574, 597 (1974) (arguing that courts "should look beyond mere word
categorizations such as 'commercial' or 'professional"').

197. 554 N.E.2d 773 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990).
198. See id. at 776.
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Some transactions do not fit the conventional definitions of sales or
services, nor can they be easily characterized as hybrid transactions.
Technological advances have enabled media publishers to market their
wares in a variety of new ways. Some of the most promising methods
involve the Internet. For example, it is now possible for customers to
download books, musical recordings and other material from Internet sites.
Since the only things that are transferred are electrons, one can argue that
no sale has occurred. On the other hand, it is hard to characterize this sort
of transaction as a service. Another marketing device is to allow customers
to download samples of material for free from Internet sites in the hopes
that they will eventually purchase similar material from the vendor. In this
case, nothing tangible is transferred and no money changes hands.
The second problem is that the dissemination of some material to the
public can be structured either as a service or as a sale. For example, the
showing of a movie in a theater is a form of entertainment, like a musical
play or a baseball game, and would seemingly be a service rather than a
sale. On the other hand, video cassette versions of movies are often
transferred from distributors to members of the public by means of sales
and rental transactions. Likewise, over-the-air television broadcasts
ordinarily would not be considered sales because nothing tangible is
transferred to the consumer. Even when television signals are transmitted
by cable or satellite dish, the transaction between the provider and the
consumer resembles a service rather than a sale. But what about "pay per
view" transactions where the cable or satellite company authorizes (and
even encourages) the consumer to record the program? This is functionally
the same as purchasing a videotape of the program, a transaction that
*would seem to resemble a sale.
By the same token, a musical recording played over the radio, as well
as music made available free of charge over the Internet, would
presumably be treated as a service. However, musical recordings are
commonly sold to the public in the form of records, audio cassettes and
compact discs. Similarly, entrepreneurs who make video games available
to consumers in arcades clearly provide a service because nothing tangible
is transferred. At the same time, video games in a diskette or CD format
are commonly sold and rented. Likewise, viewing underdressed and
oversexed performers on the Internet is not unlike watching a blue movie
at a theater or on cable television, but downloading pornographic material
from a Web site to an individual computer hard drive for a fee resembles
a sale.
It is evident that the Restatement's traditional distinction between sales
and services will not provide much assistance to courts who are trying to
decide whether strict liability is an appropriate liability standard to apply
to media defendants. This may explain why most courts have chosen to
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avoid this particular can of worms in favor of more manageable issues such
as "what is a product?"
D. The Defect Requirement
Although strict liability subjects product sellers to liability without
fault, ' it does not impose absolute liability,2" because liability is
conditioned upon the existence of some sort of "defect" in the product.2"'
Defects are normally divided into three categories: manufacturing defects,
design defects and inadequate warnings.2 " A manufacturing defect is a
one-of-a-kind condition that arises because of some flaw in the production
process. 20 3 A design defect exists when every product from a particular
production line possesses the same dangerous characteristic. 0" In addition,
an otherwise defect-free product may be treated as defective when the
seller fails to provide adequate warnings or instructions. 2 5 It should be

199. See Waterson v. General Motors Corp., 544 A.2d 357, 372 (N.J. 1988) (declaring that
"(t]he essence of an action in strict liability is that the injured party is relieved of the burden of
proving the manufacturer's negligence").
200. See Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 654 P.2d 343, 353 (Haw. 1982) (declaring that
"[s]trict products liability was never intended to be 'absolute liability"'); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co.,
365 N.W.2d 176, 181 (Mich. 1984) (observing that courts "have never gone so far as to make
sellers insurers of their products and thus absolutely liable for any and all injuries sustained from
the use of those products"); Bellotte v. Zayre Corp., 352 A.2d 723,724 (N.H. 1976) (holding that
"[s]ellers are not insurers nor are they subject to absolute liability"); Shawver v. Roberts Corp., 280
N.W.2d 226, 231 (Wis. 1979) (concluding that "[s]trict liability does not make the manufacturer
or seller an insurer nor does it impose absolute liability").
201. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 879 (Alaska 1979) (holding that a
product "must be defective as marketed if liability is to attach, and 'defective' must mean something
more than a condition causing physical injury"); see also Michael J. Tdoke, Note, Categorical
Liabilityfor Manifestly UnreasonableDesigns: Why the Comment d CaveatShould Be Removed
from the Restatement (Third), 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1205-06 (1996) (stating that "[a]t the
center of traditional products liability doctrine is the idea that a product must be defective in some
way before its manufacturer will be held legally responsible for injuries resulting from its use").
202. See David G. Owen, The Graying ofProductsLiability Law: PathsTaken and Untaken
in the New Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (1994).
203. See Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 417 N.E.2d 545, 552-53 (N.Y. 1981) (stating that a
defectively manufactured product "result[s] from some mishap in the manufacturing process itself,
improper workmanship, or because defective materials were used in construction").
204. See Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978) (declaring that
"[a] design defect occurs when the product is manufactured in conformity with the intended design
but the design itself poses unreasonable dangers to consumers").
205. See Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prod. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 716 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding that "[t]he absence of adequate warnings or directions may render a product defective and
unreasonably dangerous, even if the product has no manufacturing or design defects"); Pavlides v.
Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 338 (5th Cir. 1984) (declaring that "[t]he lack of
adequate warnings renders a product defective and unreasonably dangerous even if there is no
manufacturing or design defect in the product").
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noted that the new Restatement of Torts limits product defects to these
three categories. 2°6
Because no single definition is adequate to cover every type of product
defect, courts have developed a number of different approaches. For
example, according to the "deviation from the norm" test, usually confined
to manufacturing defect situations, a product is classified as defective if it
deviates from the manufacturer's intended design or if it is inferior in
workmanship or materials to similar products.7 Another approach, known
as the consumer expectation test, is derived from Section 402A, comment
i, which defines the term "unreasonably dangerous. 20 8 The consumer
expectations test treats a product as defective if it turns out to be more
dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect it to be.2°9 The most
popular approach, the risk-utility test, characterizes a product as defective
if the risks associated with the product exceed its overall utility.210
It can be readily seen that neither the various categories of product
defect, nor the tests for determining the existence of a defect, fit very well
with the concept of either misinformation or harmful ideas. Perhaps, one
could argue that failing to warn about the inherent dangers of engaging in
an activity described by the defendant is equivalent to failing to warn about
211
the inherent dangers associated with an otherwise non-defective product.
Providing actual misinformation, as opposed to falling to warn altogether,
might be compared to providing instructions or warnings that are factually
inaccurate. 212 At least in these cases, it is theoretically possible, as with
other types of warnings, to compare the publisher's conduct to an objective
standard.
However, there is really no obvious relationship between "bad" ideas
and any accepted category of product defect. One analogy would be
product category liability, a controversial theory which does away with the
§ 2(1998).
207. See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 304 (N.J. 1983) (observing that a product
can be considered defective if it fails to conform to the manufacturer's own standards or to products
of the same kind).
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. i (1965).
209. See Tiderman v. Fleetwood Homes, 684 P.2d 1302, 1305 (Wash. 1984) (observing that
"[a] product is not reasonably safe when it is unsafe to an extent beyond which would be reasonably
206. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCrS LIABILITY

contemplated by the ordinary consumer").
210. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443,454 (Cal. 1978) (concluding that a product
may be found defective "if the jury finds that the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design
outweighs the benefits of such design").
211. See Sandra K. Ross, Note, The Imposition of Tort Liability on Publishers Who Fail to
Warn, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 261, 268 (1992) (arguing that "[a] publication is defective... if
distributed without warnings sufficient to notify the reader of the possibility of danger").
212. See Noah, supra note 148, at 1211 (pointing out that "products liability claims against
authors and publishers of books containinghazardous misinformation more closely resemble claims
premised on inadequate warnings").
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requirement of a specific defect and allows the court to condemn an entire
category of products, such as handguns or cigarettes, if the perceived risks
associated with the particular category outweigh its perceived benefits." 3
However, this theory has been rejected by the drafters of the Third
Restatement2 14 as well as the vast majority of courts. 15 Moreover, even if
a risk-benefit test were adopted, there would be no principled way for
courts or juries to measure the largely intangible risks and benefits that
flow from publishing. Finally, it would be inconsistent with First
Amendment values to have courts or juries decide on the basis of
ideological content whether a publication is defective or not. The notion
of ideas being defective is repugnant to the principle of free expression.
E. Cause-inFact
Courts employ the "but for" test or the substantial factor test to
determine cause-in-fact.216 In most cases, the appropriate test of causation
is the "but for" test, under which the plaintiff must prove that he or she
would not have been injured if the act in question had not occurred.217 It
should be noted that more than one act or event in a particular case may
satisfy the "but for" test of causation; the purpose of this test is merely to
determine whether a specific act committed by the defendant is among the
many "but for" causes of the plaintiff's injury. If it is, the defendant may
be held liable. However, if the plaintiff's injury would have occurred
anyway, the defendant's act will not be considered to be a "but for" cause
of the plaintiff's injury and the defendant will not be held liable. When the
213. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American
ProductsLiability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263,
1297-1328 (1991) (discussing the theory of product category liability); Ellen Wertheimer, The
Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product CategoryLiability andAlternative FeasibleDesigns in the
Third Restatement, 61 TEN. L. REV. 1429, 1440-54 (1994) (same).
214. See Richard C. Ausness, Product CategoryLiability: A CriticalAnalysis,24 N. KY. L.

REv. 423,428-29 (1997).
215. See Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1225 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated, 505
U.S. 1215, reaff'd on remand, 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992) (tobacco products); Roysdon v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230,236 (6th Cir. 1988) (tobacco products); Shipman v. Jennings
Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1533-34 (11th Cir. 1986) (handguns); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762
F.2d 1250, 1274 (5th Cir. 1985) (handguns); Miller v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 679
F. Supp. 485,489 (E.D. Pa.), af'd,856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988) (tobacco products); Armijo v. Ex
Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771,773 (D.N.M. 1987), aft'd,843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988) (handguns);
Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751,754 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (handguns); Dauphin Deposit
Bank & Trust Co. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 596 A.2d 845, 849 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (alcoholic
beverages).
216. See Gerald R. Smith, Note, MediaLiabilityforPhysicalInjuryResultingfrom Negligent
Use of Words, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1193, 1197 (1988).
217. See Anne K. Hilker, Note, Tort Liability of the Media for Audience Violence: A
ConstitutionalAnalysis,52 S. CAL. L. REV. 529, 534 (1979).
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"but for" test does not work properly, courts are forced to rely on the
substantial factor test. Under this approach, the defendant's act may be
considered a cause-in-fact if it substantially contributes to the plaintiff's
harm. 21" This test is often used when two actions occur, each of which is
sufficient to cause the injury in question. 2 9
A number of empirical studies suggest that there is some sort of causal
connection between portrayals of violence and violence in real life,
particularly when viewed by children or young people. 220 Social scientists
who examined the subject of television have developed a number of
" ' According to one theory, known
theories to explain this phenomenon.22
as the modeling or instructional theory, children learn to behave
aggressively by watching violent acts on television in much the same way
that they learn behavioral patterns from parents and other role models.222
A second theory suggests that viewing violence desensitizes viewers to the
negative effects of violence and thereby reduces their inhibitions against
aggression toward others. 223 A third theory assumes that an observer may
be directly stimulated to engage in aggressive behavior after viewing
violent acts on television.224 These behavioral theories are presumably
applicable to violence depicted in movies, video games, and musical lyrics,
as well as they are to television violence.22

218. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 431-433 (1965).
219. The classic example of this is the twin fires hypothetical in which fires are set by the
negligence of two individuals. The fires come together and burn the plaintiff's house. If each fire
was sufficiently strong to burn down the house on its own, neither act of negligence would qualify
as a "but for" cause of the plaintiff's loss. However, under the substantial factor test, ajury could
find that each defendant's negligence substantially contributed to the destruction of the plaintiff's
house.
220. See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Lucas A. Powe, Televised Violence, First
Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REV. 1123, 1136-57 (1978)
(discussing studies); John P. Murray, The Impact of Televised Violence, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 809,
813-21 (1992) (same); Emily Campbell, Comment, Television Violence: SocialScience vs. the Law,
10 LoY. ENT. L.J. 413,419-36 (1990) (same).
221. See WILAMR. CATTON, MASS MEDIA AS ACTIVATORS OFLATENTTENDENCIES in MASS

MEDIA AND VIOLENCE 301, 303 (1971) (discussing some of these theories).
222. See Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theoriesof CriminalDefense Based Upon the Toxicity of the
Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV.
731,769 (1996); see also Prettyman & Hook, supranote 22, at 327 (describing the modeling theory
of violence).
223. See Stephen J. Kim, Comment, "Viewer DiscretionIsAdvised": A StructuralApproach
,to the Issue of Televised Violence, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1391 (1994).
224. See Michael I. Spak, PredictableHarm: Should the Media Be Liable?, 42 OHIO ST. L.J.
671,674 (1981).
225. See Peter Johnson, PornographyDrives Technology: Why Not to Censorthe Internet,49
FED. COMM. L.J. 217, 224 (1996) (pointing out that some psychologists believe that computer
violence, because it is interactive, might have a socializing effect).
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Of course, not everyone agrees with these conclusions. 226 Critics point
out that most of the social science research has focused on the statistical
correlation between viewing patterns of large groups over time rather than
focusing on the effects of single viewings of violent material.227 It has also
been suggested that results based on laboratory experiments do not
sufficiently replicate real world conditions to allow researchers to form any
firm conclusions about media violence and violence in the real world.228
Finally, only a small fraction of viewers of media violence actually engage
in violent behavior, 229 thereby calling into question the thesis that media
violence is a significant cause of real-life violence.
The causation issue is also muddled with respect to obscene and
sexually explicit material. A number of social scientists and legal
commentators claim that viewers of such material are more likely than
non-viewers to commit rape and other acts of sexual abuse against
women. 23 Some years ago, a study by the Attorney General's Commission
on Pornography, known as the Meese Commission, also concluded that
certain forms of pornography could lead to crimes of sexual violence. 2 '
226. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 220, at 1157 ("Perhaps violent fare on television
causes harmful, illegal violence in isolated individuals, in identifiable groups (large or small), or
throughout society at large. We have, however, seen little convincing evidence that it does."); see
also Michael A. Coletti, Comment, FirstAmendment Implicationsof Rock Lyric Censorship, 14
PEPP. L. REV. 421,439 (1987) (arguing that "antisocial behavior has not been conclusively traced
to the media"); John W. Holt, Comment, ProtectingAmerica's Youth: CanRock Music Lyrics Be
ConstitutionallyRegulated?, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 53, 68 (1990) (concluding that "[t]here is no
conclusive evidence that anti-social illegal behavior can be traced to sexual or violent themes in the
media").
227. See Prettyman & Hook, supra note 22, at 362.
228. See Campbell, supranote 220, at 449 (claiming that "[i]t is misleading to juries to have
social science experts testify that viewing violence leads to aggressive behavior, when the types of
behavior studied in a controlled environment are different from those in the cases presented before
the courts").
229. See Campbell, supra note 220, at 436 ("the evidence does not suggest that television
violence has a uniform negative effect, or that it affects a majority of children").
230. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography,Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 1,42-45 (1985) (declaring that "[s]pecific pornography directly causes some [sexual]
assaults"); Frederick Shauer, CausationTheory and the Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987 Am. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 737, 767 (stating that "sexually violent material, some but not much of which
happens to be sexually explicit and some but even less of which is legally obscene, bears a causal
relationship, taken probalistically, to the incidence of sexual violence in this society"); Note, AntiPornographyLaws and FirstAmendment Values, 98 HARV. L. REV. 460, 479 (1984) (contending
that "[a]n increasing number of recent studies suggest that exposure to violent pornography has a
negative effect on a male viewer's attitudes toward women and may decrease his reluctance to abuse
them").
231. See Attorney General's Comm'n on Pornography, U.S. Dept. ofJustice, Final Report 326
(1986) (concluding that "substantial exposure to sexually violent materials as described here bears
a causal relationship to antisocial acts of sexual violence and, for some subgroups, possibly to
unlawful acts of sexual violence").
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However, others deny that such a causal link exists between pornography
and sexual violence.232 They point out that most viewers of sexually
explicit material do not commit acts of sexual violence against women.233
Indeed, some commentators have suggested that pornography may actually
discourage sexual violence.2
In any event, even if a plaintiff can show a generalized connection
between portrayals of sex or violence in the media and violent behavior in
the real world, he or she will also have to prove that specific depictions of
sex or violence by the defendant have directly caused the injury in
question. Even though the plaintiff would not have to prove that a specific
item of violence or pornography was the sole cause of the plaintiff's injury,
he or she would still have to establish the injury would not have occurred
if the defendant
had not published the particular item of violence or
2 35
pornography.
Of course, there are some cases where cause-in-fact may be less of a
problem for the plaintiff. For example, causation is easier to prove when
a plaintiff relies on incorrect information provided by the defendant, as in
Winter236 or Cardozo,237 and that reliance directly leads to the injury in
question. Plaintiffs should also be able to satisfy the causation requirement
in cases like Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc. 231 where a third party
faithfully follows explicit instructions provided by the defendant, a jury
could reasonably conclude that the third party could not have committed
the crime without the defendant's assistance. Likewise, in "gun-for-hire"

232. See Stephen G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography
as Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1564, 1600 (1988) (claiming that "no one has been able to
demonstrate that identifiable, physical harms result directly from pornography"); Jessalyn
Hershinger, Note, State Restrictions on Violent Expression: The Impropriety of Extending an
Obscenity Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV. 473,491 (1993) (declaring that "feminist theorists have not
produced sufficiently persuasive data to substantiate their claim that obscenity leads to violence

against women").
233. See Cass R. Sunstein, Pornographyandthe FirstAmendment, 1986 DuKE L.J. 589, 600
(observing that "[m]ost consumers of pornography do not commit acts of sexual violence").
234. See Johnson,supra note 225, at 223 (stating that "several studies have suggested that, far
from creating sexist, violent feelings in young men, pornography has a calming, cathartic effect,
easing adolescent cares with a dose of mild erotica").
235. See Elise M. Whitaker, Note, PornographicLiabilityfor PhysicalHarms Caused by
Obscenity andChildPornography:A TortAnalysis, 27 GA. L. REV. 849,893 (1993) (declaring that
"an abstract link between pornography [or media depictions of violent acts] and criminal behavior
is actually irrelevant, for plaintiffs must prove a causal link in their own cases in order to recover").
236. Winter, 938 F.2d at 1033.
237. Cardozo,342 So. 2d at 1053.
238. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1515 (1998).
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cases like Norwood,239 Eimann,2 orBraun,241the plaintiff could argue that
prospective employers could not contact hit men and, thus, could not carry
out their murderous plots, without the defendant's direct assistance. Cause242
in-fact is also relatively easy to prove in cases such as DeFilippo,
243
24
245
Herceg, Sakon, Olivia N, where the recipient closely imitates an
activity that has been depicted in the media.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, would have considerable more difficulty
proving cause-in-fact in inspiration cases such as McCollum
?A2 and
247
Waller, where disturbed teenagers were allegedly induced to commit
suicide by Ozzy Osborne's music, or Byers,248 where viewers imitated a
crime spree portrayed in the movie Natural Born Killers. Although
plaintiffs might go far with the help of compliant experts and sympathetic
juries, it will be hard for them to dispute the fact that mentally unstable
teenagers are often human time bombs waiting for some trivial event to set
them off. Thus, defendants can argue that the violent acts would have
occurred anyway.
F. Proximate Cause
Even if the plaintiff proves the existence of a causal relationship
between the defendant's actions and the plaintiff's physical injury, a court
may still deny liability for lack of proximate cause.' 49 There are two
scenarios where a proximate cause analysis is relevant to the issue of
liability in media publication cases. The first is where the victim seeks to
hold a third party liable for his or her own suicide; the second is where the
victim is injured by the intervening criminal acts of third parties. In the
first scenario, the plaintiff would contend that the defendant should be
aware of his or her suicidal tendencies and, therefore, avoid publishing
material that might induce the plaintiff to commit suicide. According to the
traditional rule, suicide is considered to be a voluntary act and, therefore,
a superseding cause, even though the defendant's wrongful conduct
contributes to it.2 0 To be sure, courts sometimes impose an affirmative

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at 1397.
Eimann, 880 F.2d at 830.
Braun, 968 F.2d at 1110.
DeFilippo,446 A.2d at 1037-38.
Herceg, 565 F. Supp. at 802.
Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 163.
Olivia N, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
Waller, 763 F. Supp. at 1144.
Byers, 712 So. 2d at 681.
See Prettyman & Hook, supra note 22, at 363.
See Lancaster v. Montesi, 390 S.W.2d 217, 221 (Tenn. 1965) (declaring that "[w]here
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duty to prevent suicide upon psychiatrists and hospitals when the victim is
known to be insane or emotionally unstable. 51 However, these cases
typically involve some sort of custodial or professional relationship
between the defendant and the suicide victim. In contrast, no such
relationship exists between media publishers and their customers. The only
relationship that does exist, and it is an attenuated one at that, is an arm's
length commercial relationship. Only the most optimistic plaintiff would
argue that a duty to protect a third party against his or her own selfdestructive acts could arise from such a purely commercial relationship.
In the second scenario, the plaintiff would argue that media defendants
have a duty to refrain from conduct that would cause other listeners or
viewers to commit violent criminal acts against them. As a general rule,
there is no affirmative duty to protect someone against the acts of a third
person.252 This is particularly true when the intervening conduct involves
intentional or criminal misconduct.253 After all, it is the third party, not the
defendant, who is the actual perpetrator of the crime. However, there are
a number of exceptions to this general rule. For example, a defendant may
be liable for falling to protect the plaintiff from the criminal acts of third
persons (1) when the defendant has a contractual or relational duty to do
so and fails to act, (2) when the defendant's affirmative act defeats the
plaintiff's protective efforts, (3) when the defendant brings the plaintiff
into close association with third parties who are likely to commit crimes,
and (4) when the defendant has taken a dangerous person into custody and
then fails to properly restrain him. 4 However, it is difficult to see how any
of these exceptions apply to media publishers. There is rarely any special
relationship between publishers and victims; indeed, there is no
relationship at all except a purely commercial one. Nor can it be said that
the publication of violent or sexually explicit material frustrates any
affirmative protective measures that potential victims may have taken to
protect themselves against the violent acts of third parties. Since there is
no personal contact between media publishers and their listeners or

the intervening cause relied on takes the form of suicide, then the cases both in this jurisdiction and
elsewhere have generally held there to be no liability").
251. See Meier v. Ross Gen. Hosp., 445 P.2d 519,522-23 (Cal. 1968) (holding that "[ifthose
charged with the care and treatment of a mentally disturbed patient know of facts from which they
could reasonably conclude that the patient would be likely to harm himself in the absence of
preclusive measures, then they must use reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent such
harm").

252. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 315 (1965).
253. See id. § 447 (1965); see also Whitaker, supra note 235, at 886 (observing that "[a]s a
general rule, intentional torts or crimes committed by independent actors relieve a defendant from
liability because the intervening conduct is said to break the causal chain").
254. See JOHN W. WADEETAL,PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 321-22 (9th ed, 1994); see also Hilker, supra note 217, at 537-38.
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viewers, or between media publishers and individual victims, there would
be no reason to conclude that media publishers have brought victims into
contact with dangerous third parties. This lack of personal contact between
criminal or victim would also seem to defeat any liability based on a
custody rationale.
G. Conclusion
The prospects for recovery against media publishers are extremely poor
as long as courts insist that plaintiffs scrupulously satisfy all of the
doctrinal requirements. For example, the Third Restatement of Torts
defines the term product as "tangible" property, 5 a definition that may
exclude information and ideas, particularly when they are not embodied in
a tangible medium that can be transferred from the producer to the
consumer. The sale requirement may be excluded in cases where no
tangible object is transferred. The defect requirement is another stumbling
block. While a court might allow ajury to determine that inaccurate factual
information is "defective," it is doubtful that it will permit ajury to subject
the publisher to civil liability just because it disapproves of the publisher's
ideas or viewpoint. Likewise, plaintiffs will have to prove causation. This
might be possible where the defendant publishes inaccurate information,
or when facilitation or imitation is involved; however, plaintiffs will find
it almost impossible to prove causation when a media publisher merely
inspires another to engage in violent conduct. Finally, courts are reluctant
to hold someone responsible, in the absence of a special relationship, for
the independent acts of third parties,

III.

FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES

Media publishers are not shy about claiming First Amendment
protection and, so far, their efforts have been highly successful. When
sexually explicit material is involved, one would expect courts to turn to
the law of obscenity for guidance. On the other hand, courts seem disposed
to apply Brandenburg v. Ohio's256 incitement analysis to decide claims
against the media involving depictions of violence.
A. The Nature andScope of the FirstAmendment
The First Amendment to the Constitution declares, among other things,
that "Congress shall make no law . . abridging the freedom of
speech.. .., This language prohibits the federal government from

255. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19 (1998).
256. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
257. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
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enacting laws that attempt to restrict or prohibit free expression. 8 Not all
speech receives the same degree of First Amendment protection. 9 Speech
about important political, social, cultural or scientific topics lies at the apex
of the constitutional pyramid; commercial speech appears to occupy an
intermediate level; and so-called "low value" speech languishes at the
bottom.
Although some scholars maintain that First Amendment protection
should be limited to political speech,260 the Supreme Court has expanded
concept of protected speech to include observations about art, literature,
science, religion, and all other aspects of culture and society.261
Furthermore, protected speech is no longer limited to 2written
or spoken
62
work, but now extends to many forms of expression, such as art,263
music, 264 movies,261and even dancing. 26 According to accepted doctrine,

258. The right of free speech is also protected against state legislation by the fourteenth
amendment. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 599 n.2 (1980) (Stewart,
J., concurring); Edward J. Naughton, Note, Is Cyberspacea Public Forum? Computer Bulletin
Boards, Free Speech, and State Action, 81 GEO. L.J. 409, 413 (1992).
259. See Diamond & Primm, supra note 180, at 971 (discussing the hierarchy of free speech
categories); see also Thomas C. Kates, Note, Publisher Liability for "Gun for Hire"
Advertisements: Responsible Exercise of Free Speech or Self-Censorship?, 35 WAYNE L. REV.
1203, 1206-07 (1989) (same).
260. See, e.g., ALEXANDERM. BICKEL, THEMORALITYOFCONSENT62 (1975) (declaring that
"the First Amendment should protect and indeed encourage speech so long as it serves to make the
political process work"); Lillian R. BeVier, The FirstAmendmentandPoliticalSpeech: An Inquiry
into the Substance andLimits of Principle,30 STAN. L. REV. 299,358 (1978) (contending that "the
sole legitimate first amendment principle protects only speech that participates in the process of
representative democracy").
261. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,231 (1977) (declaring that "our cases
have never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or
ethical matters.., is not entitled to full First Amendment protection").
262. See C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 CALL. REV. 979,983 (1997)
(pointing out that "[miusic, art, and photographs, whether or not they have propositional content,
receive protection under the constitutional term 'speech'); Block, supranote 8, at 790 (observing
that "[t]he first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech extends to all artistic and literary
expression, including concerts, plays, pictures, books, movies, music, and nude dancing"); Scot
Silverglate, Comment, SubliminalPerceptionandthe FirstAmendment: Yelling Firein a Crowded
Mind?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1243, 1249 (1990) (stating that "motion pictures, radio broadcasts,
television, and musical and dramatic works.., fall within the first amendment's guarantee of
freedom of expression").
263. See Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,557-58 (1975); Interstate Circuit
v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676,682 (1968); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,501-02 (1952);
see also Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 77 (1996) (observing that "it is
generally accepted that the First Amendment contemplates protection of art"); Note, Standardsfor
Federal Fundingof the Arts: Free Expression and PoliticalControl, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1969,
1980 (1990) (arguing that "[a]n examination of first amendment doctrine strongly suggests that
works of art are presumptively protected speech").
264. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,790 (1989) (holding that "[m]usic, as
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government cannot regulate core speech on the basis of subject matter or
viewpoine 67 unless it shows that the regulation in question is necessary to
serve a compelling governmental interest. 268 The burden of justification is
particularly great when the government's regulation amounts to prior
restraint of free expression.269
Commercial speech occupies a position somewhere between fullyprotected speech and "low value" speech in the First Amendment
hierarchy. ° In its simplest form, commercial speech can be defined as

a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment"); Cinevision
Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 567 (9th Cir. 1984); Holt, supra note 226, at 53 (stating
that music is protected under the First Amendment); see also Coletti, supra note 226, at 446
(discussing the ideological and philosophical aspects of music).
265. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952); see also Kenneth D.
Rozell, Comment, Missouri Statute Attacks "Violent" Videos: Are FirstAmendment Rights in
Danger?, 10 LOY. ENT. L.J. 655, 664 (1990) (declaring that "motion pictures are included in the
free speech and free press guaranty of the first and fourteenth amendments").
266. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (stating that
"[e]ntertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected").
267. Although the principal dichotomy is between "content-based" and "content-neutral"
regulations, the former category can be divided into state action that regulates speech on the basis
of subject matter and state action that regulates speech on the basis of viewpoint. The first
subcategory involves regulations that restrict speech on the basis of subject matter, regardless of
the author's point of view on the subject; the second subcategory includes regulations that censor
particular opinions or viewpoints on a subject. See Sunstein, supra note 233, at 609-10.
268. See Arkansas Writers' Project,Inc., 481 U.S. at 230 (stating that"[s]uch official scrutiny
of the content of publications as the basis for imposing a tax is entirely incompatible with the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press"); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49
(1984) (holding that "[r]egulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of
the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment"); American Booksellers
Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323,325 (7th Cir. 1985) (declaring that "[tihe Constitution forbids
the state to declare one perspective right and silence opponents"); Naughton, supra note 258, at 413
(declaring that "[i]t is clear that the States and congress may not prohibit speech on the basis of its
content or viewpoint without a compelling governmental interest"); Ross, supra note 211, at 272
(stating that "[a] regulation found to be aimed at the content of speech will be invalidated unless
it either comes within one of the narrow exceptions or is necessary to further a compelling state
interest").
269. See NebraskaPress Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58,70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,713 (193 1); see alsoPrettyman & Hook,
supra note 22, at 377 (arguing that "[h]istorically, prior restraints on speech have been considered
particularly burdensome, and thus bear a heavy presumption of invalidity"); Hilker, supranote 217,
at 568 (declaring that prior restraints "carry a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity
because they are especially burdensome on free speech").
270. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,456 (1978) (declaring that "we...
have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale ofFirst Amendment values"); see alsoTimothy J.Tatro, Casenote,
Braun v. Soldier of Fortune: Tort Law Enters the Braun'sAge as ConstitutionalSafeguardsfor
ConunercialSpeech Buckle 'Neath the Crunch of Third-PartyLiability,30 SAN DIEGOL. REV. 957,
967 (1993) (stating that "[c]ommercial speech was not afforded absolute protection, however, and
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speech, such as an advertisement, that proposes a commercial
transaction. 2" More broadly, commercial speech is "expression related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience."27 2 In
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Committee, the
Court set forth a number of criteria that must be met before the government
can regulate commercial speech.273 First, the Court declared that
commercial speech that was deceptive or intended to serve an illegal
purpose could be summarily banned.274 Other commercial speech could be
regulated only if: (1) regulation was necessary to advance a substantial
governmental interest; (2) the regulation in question would directly
advance that interest; and (3) the regulation was no more extensive than
necessary.2 75 While the level of constitutional protection accorded to
commercial speech under the CentralHudson approach is significant, it
still falls below that enjoyed by other forms of protected speech.276
At the very bottom of the constitutional hierarchy is so-called "low
value" speech, 27' which is characterized by minimal communicative value
coupled with
a high
risk of social harm. 7 ' This type of
speech includes (1)
,,
',279210
28128
79
"fighting words," (2) defamation, (3) obscenity, (4) profanity, 2 (5)

still sits somewhat lower in the constitutional hierarchy than political speech").
271. See Zaudererv. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,637 (1985); Ohralik,436
U.S. at 455-56.
272. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Corp., 447 U.S. 557,561 (1980).
At the same time, protected speech does not lose its privileged status merely because it is published
for profit. See Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Liberating CommercialSpeech: ProductLabeling
Controls and the FirstAmendment, 47 FLA. L. REV. 63, 75 (1995).

273. 447 U.S. at 557.
274. See id. at 566.
275. See id.

276. See Noah, supra note 148, at 1224-25 (stating that "[a]t present, the court utilizes a form
of intermediate scrutiny to assess challenges to restrictions on commercial speech, providing that
false or misleading commercial speech receives no protection"); David W. Kantaros, Comment,
ConstitutionalLaw: Striking an AppropriateBalance Between Negligence and Freedom of the
Pressfor Publishers-Brown v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 27 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 244, 246

(1993) (observing that "the Supreme Court of the United States has determined that the First
Amendment provides less protection to commercial speech than to other forms of speech").
277. See Geoffrey R. Stone, ContentRegulationand the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY

L. REV. 189,194 (1983) (discussing the concept of low value speech); Tom Hentoff, Note, Speech,
Hann, and Self-Government: Understandingthe Ambit of the ClearandPresentDangerTest, 91

COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1464 (1991) (same).
278. See Crump, supra note 10, at 48; see also Sunstein, supra note 233, at 603-04.
279. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
280. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1952).
281. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,54 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 19-20 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (declaring that "obscenity is
not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press").
282. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971).
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speech or writing, such as perjury, which is inherently unlawful or which
is used to carry out a criminal act,283 (6) incitements to imminent unlawful
action,"8 4 and (7) child pornography.2" 5 Although the government cannot
suppress low-value speech arbitrarily,8 6 courts will normally uphold
restrictions, or even complete prohibitions, of low-value speech as long as
the government can show a rational basis for its actions.28 7
B. FirstAmendment Protectionfor Movies,
Video Games, and Internet Web Sites
To assess whether a particular communication is protected by the First
Amendment, a court must first determine if the defendant's actions amount
to speech or expression. Once that issue is resolved, the court must decide
if the defendant's expression falls within the ambit of protected speech or
not. As far as the first question is concerned, it seems clear that actions
depicted in movies, as well as dialogue, are a recognized form of
expression.28 8 The same is true for visual representations in paintings and
photographs.28 9 Presumably, such materials are also protected speech when
they appear on Web sites.
On the other hand, no court has squarely held that video games
constitute a form of expression for First Amendment purposes. Indeed, in
the early 1980s a number of courts concluded that video games were not
a recognized form of speech .2 ° These courts reasoned that protected

283. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490,498 (1949); United States v.
Barnett, 667 F.2d 835,842 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549,551 (9th Cir.
1985); see also C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL L. REV. 979, 982
(1997) (observing that "[s]peech can be a means of committing or attempting to commit a crime
defined in nonspeech terms").
284. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that "the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
285. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,758 (1982).
286. See Stone, supra note 277, at 195 (observing that "[t]he conclusion that a particular class
of speech has only low first amendment value does not mean that the speech is wholly without
constitutional protection or that the government may suppress it at will").
287. See Block, supra note 8, at 794 (stating that "[o]nce speech is labelled 'obscene,' only a
rational basis for eliminating that speech is required").
288. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 502 (holding that "expression by means of motion
pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments").
289. See Baker, supra note 262, at 983 (contending that "art and photographs, whether or not
they have propositional content, receive protection under the constitutional term 'speech').
290. See Maiden Amusement Co. v. City of Malden, 582 F. Supp. 297,299 (D. Mass. 1983)
(declaring that "video games are not protected speech within the First Amendment"); America's
Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
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expression required the communication of information or ideas.29 1 In their
view, the primitive video games of yesteryear were little more than
glorified pinball machines. 2 2 Even so, at least one court intimated that
video games might evolve to the point where they had sufficient idea
content to qualify as protected speech under the First Amendment.293
Modem games are certainly more complex and sophisticated than their
earlier predecessors. The programming architecture has sufficient
intellectual content that video game software may qualify as an original
work under copyright law. 294 Moreover, modem computer games have
music, dialogue, and plots. Arguably, therefore, they satisfy the threshold
requirements of free expression.
Assuming that material depicted in movies, video games and Internet
Web sites can be considered forms of expression, we must then determine
if these particular forms of expression are core speech protected by the
First Amendment or whether they are merely low-value speech.
1. Liability for the Dissemination of Sexually Explicit Material
As mentioned earlier, the plaintiffs in James v. Meow Media contend
that sexually explicit material obtained by Michael Cameal from
commercial Web sites contributed to his violent behavior and, therefore,
argue that the owners of these Web sites should be held liable in tort for
their injuries. 295
When discussing sexually explicit material, it is important to

(observing that "although video game programs may be copyrighted, they 'contain so little in the
way of particularized form of expression' that video games cannot be fairly characterized as a form
of speech protected by the First Amendment"); Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Town of
Marshfield, 450 N.E.2d 605,610 (Mass. 1983) (stating that "[w]e are not prepared... to hold that
these video games.., are entitled to constitutional protection"); Caswell v. Licensing Comm'n for
Brockton, 444 N.E.2d 922,926-7 (Mass. 1983) (holding that the plaintiff "has failed to demonstrate
that video games import sufficient communicative, expressive or informative elements to constitute
expression protected under the First Amendment").
291. See America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City ofNew York, 536 F. Supp. 170, 173
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that "there must be some element of information or some idea being
communicated"); Caswell, 444 N.E.2d at 925 (declaring that "[e]ntertainment may come within the
ambit of the First Amendment, but to gain protected status, that entertainment must be designed to
communicate or express some idea or some information').
292. See America's Best FamilyShowplace Corp., 536 F. Supp. at 174 (holding that "a video
game, like a pinball game, a game of chess, or a game of baseball, is pure entertainment with no
'informational content"); Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Town ofMarshland, 450 N.E.2d 605,
610 (Mass. 1983) (describing video games as "technologically advanced pinball machines").
293. See Marshfield Family Skateland, 450 N.E.2d at 609-10 (declaring that "in the future
video games which contain sufficient communicative and expressive elements may be created").
294. See Stem Elec's, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856-7 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a
video game was sufficiently original to qualify for copyright protection).
295. Complaint, I 29.
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distinguish between obscenity and other material. The Supreme Court, in
296 set forth some of the distinguishing characteristics
Miller v. California,
of obscenity. According to the Court, in judging whether something was
obscene, one should consider: (1) whether the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) whether the work depicts or
describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way; and (3) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value. 297 As mentioned earlier, obscenity is not regarded as protected
speech298 and the government2 9 may restrict access, even by willing
recipients, to obscene material.
Despite its sexual content, pornography is thought to have some
redeeming social value. 3" From the time of Aristophanes, authors have
engaged in sexually-explicit expression to criticize existing social and
political values.30 ' Consequently, while courts have upheld reasonable
time, place and manner regulations, 0 2 they have generally not allowed the
government to restrict pornography solely on the basis of its sexual

296. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
297. Id. at 24. While the Court has defined obscenity as a legal term of art, it has not attempted
to do the same for pornography. See Amy Adler, What'sLeft? Hate Speech, Pornography,and the
Problem ofArtistic Expression, 84 CAL L. REV. 1499, 1509 n.35 (1996); see also Nadine Strosser,
A Feminist Critique of "The" Feminist Critique of Pornography,79 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1104
(1993). Others, however, have defined pornography as "materials that are highly sexually explicit
and are designed and are, in fact, used primarily for the purpose of sexual arousal." Shauer, supra
note 230, at 738. Pornography is often classified as "hard core" or "soft core"; the former depicts
actual sexual contact, while the latter merely depicts nudity or lascivious exhibition. See Rimm,
supra note 11, at 1849 n.1.
298. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989) (declaring that "[w]e have
repeatedly held the protection of the First Amendment does not extend to obscene speech"); Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15,23 (1973) (stating that "[tihis much has been categorically settled by the
Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment"); Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 635 (1968) (holding that "[o]bscenity is not within the area of protected speech or
press"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (declaring that "obscenity is not within
the area of constitutionally protected speech or press").
299. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
300. See Johnson, supranote 225, at 218 (arguing that "[p]omography, far from being an evil
that the First Amendment must endure, is a positive good that encourages experimentation with new
media").
301. See Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin, and Women'sLiberation:AgainstPorn-Suppression,72 T'EX.
L. REV. 1097, 1152 (1994) (declaring that "[s]exual expression has long been used to order,
challenge, and subvert the status quo").
302. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560,572 (1991) (upholding enforcement of
general statutory ban on nudity against nude dancers); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41,54 (1986) (upholding zoning restrictions on adult movie theaters); Youngv. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976) (same).
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content." 3 On the other hand, some sexually explicit material may be
considered obscene when viewed by minors even though it is not obscene
when sold to adults.3 'O Therefore, it should come as no surprise that
governmental officials often claim that restrictions on pornography are
intended to protect children, rather than to interfere with adults' access to
sexually explicit material. 05
Congress relied on this rationale when it enacted the Communications
Decency Act of 1996, 306 a statute that attempted to regulate the
dissemination of sexually explicit material over the Internet. 7 Section
223(a)(1)(B)(ii) imposed criminal sanctions for the "knowing"
transmission of "obscene or indecent" messages to any recipient under the
age of eighteen (the indecent transmission provision). 0 8 In addition,
section 223(d) imposed criminal liability for the knowing sending or
displaying to a person under the age of eighteen of any message "that, in
,context, depicts or describes in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs" (the "patently offensive display provision").309 The statute allowed
certain defenses based on good faith attempts by the sender to restrict
offending messages to adults.31 0 A number of parties promptly challenged
the constitutionality of the Act and a three-judge court enjoined
enforcement of its patently offensive display provisions in their entirety
along with the indecent transmission provisions insofar as they affected the
dissemination of indecent, as opposed to obscene, material.3 1 'The United
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in Reno v. American

303. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (declaring that content-based regulation
of Internet communications was not sufficiently precise to be valid); Sable Communications,492
U.S. at 126 (holding that the government may not regulate the content of protected speech unless
it demonstrates a compelling reason to do so).
304. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Obscenity as to minors is defined by
adopting the definition of obscenity for adults (appeal to prurient interest, patent offensiveness to
community standards, and lack of redeeming social value) to younger recipients. See John C.
Clearly, Note, Telephone Pornography:FirstAmendment Constraintson Shielding Childrenfrom
Dial-A-Porn,22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 503, 523 (1985).
305. See Sable Communications,492 U.S. at 115 (invalidating federal statute insofar as it
purported to regulate "indecent" telephone messages as opposed to obscene ones).
306. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996).
307. The Communications Decency Act was part oftheTelecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.
L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). The Telecommunications Act was primarily intended to promote
competition in telephone, cable and over-the-air broadcasting markets. See Reno, 512 U.S. at 85758.
308. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1996).
309. Id. § 223(d).
310. See id. § 223(e)(5) (1996).
311. See Reno v. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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Civil Liberties Union.
The Reno Court was extremely critical of the Act and clearly regarded
it as an egregious case of legislative overkill. In particular, the court
criticized the Act because it interfered with the right of parents to control
what their children were exposed to by punishing the transmission of
indecent material, regardless of whether there was parental consent or
not.3 13 The Court considered this to be an unwarranted invasion of parental
rights and declared that parents, not the government, should decide what
their children viewed on the Internet. In the Court's view, these
paternalistic aspects of the Act were aggravated by the fact that its
provisions applied to all children under the age of eighteen, despite the fact
that older teenagers were likely to be more mature than younger children
when it came to sexual matters.314 The Court also observed that the Act
banned all patently offensive material regardless of whether it had any
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.315 Thus, according to
the Court, regulated subject matter might include "discussions about prison
rape or safe sexual practices, artistic images that include nude subjects, and
' The Court also
arguably the card catalogue of the Carnegie Library."316
expressed doubts about the Act's excessively broad reach. Contrary to the
usual practice, the Act criminalized not only commercial transactions, but
also personal communications between private individuals." Thus, the
transmission of a private e-mail message could conceivably result in the
same criminal liability as the sale of hard-core pornography over the
Internet.318 Finally, the Court pointed out the effect the Act's vague
provisions might have on the exercise of protected speech by both children
and adults. 319 In the Court's opinion, Congress had made no effort to
narrowly tailor the Act in order to avoid imposing such a heavy burden on
free speech.320
The Court also viewed with suspicion various arguments advanced by
the government to justify its broad content-based regulatory scheme. For
example, the government claimed that its legal authority to regulate speech
over the Internet was comparable to its regulatory power over the radio and

312. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). For a discussion of the Reno case see Praveen Goyal, Comment,
CongressFumbles with the Internet: Reno v. ACLU, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 637 (1998).
313. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 865.
314. See id. at 865-66.
315. See id. at 865.
316. Id. at 878.
317. Seeid. at865.
318. See id. at 878 (pointing out that a parent who send his 17-year old college freshman birth
control information by e-mail could be incarcerated for violating the Act).
319. See id. at 871-74.

320. See id. at 879.
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television broadcasting industry. 32 Earlier Supreme Court opinions had
upheld regulations of the broadcast media because of the prior history of
extensive regulation with respect to broadcasting,322 the scarcity of
available broadcast frequencies,323 and the invasive nature of material
broadcast over the airwaves. 324 The Court in Reno, however, rejected this
supposed analogy between the broadcast industry and the Internet. 3' The
court observed the Internet was not regulated as extensively as the
broadcast industry. 326 Moreover, unlike the situation in the broadcast
industry, virtually anyone could use the Internet as a forum for
expression.32 Finally, the Court declared that the Internet was not an
invasive medium and concluded that users would rarely encounter
unwanted sexually explicit material purely by accident.328
The government also contended that the Act's provisions were
necessary to protect children from exposure to indecent and sexually
explicit material on the Internet.329 While the Court acknowledged that the
government had a legitimate interest in protecting children from exposure
to harmful material, 330 it declared that this interest was not sufficient 3to
3
justify regulations that unnecessarily restricted adult speech. '
Furthermore, the Court disputed the government's contention that the Act's
regulatory scheme would not interfere with adult-to-adult
communication.332 It noted that there was a difference between devices that
would allow parents to prevent their children from reaching certain Web
sites and devices that would allow owners of sexually explicit Web sites
to detect and screen out underage viewers. The Court found that
inexpensive technology was readily available for parents to screen out
unwanted material, but that it would be prohibitively expensive for Web

321. See id. at 868-70.
322. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 399-400 (1969).
323. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1994); Note, The Message
in the Medium: The FirstAmendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062,
1070 (1994) (stating that "[t]he current legal regime permits significant broadcast regulation on the
grounds that the electromagnetic spectrum is a scarce public resource').
324. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
325. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 868.
326. See id. at 868-69.
327. See id. at 870.
328. See id. at 869.
329. See id. at 874.
330. See id. at 875; see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
331. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 875; see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, 518 U.S. 727,759 (1996); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989); Bolger
v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,74-75 (1983); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383

(1957).
332. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 876-77.
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site owners to verify whether viewers who accessed their Web site were
adults or not. Consequently, the Court concluded that requiring Web site
owners to keep minors from accessing their Web sites would significantly
restrict access to the Internet by adults.333
The government also maintained that the unregulated availability of
sexually explicit material on the Internet was driving away people who
were afraid to risk exposure to such material.334 The Court, however,
characterized this claim as "singularly unpersuasive."335 As the Court
observed, the impressive growth of the Internet in recent years belied the
notion that people were being discouraged from using it.3 36 In the Court's
words, "[t]he interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a
democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of
censorship. 337
The Reno decision involved a criminal statute and, therefore, would not
be directly applicable to the issue of tort liability. However, Reno does
suggest that the Court will not look with favor upon actions which
potentially chill free expression on the Internet. If tort liability poses a
threat to free expression on the Internet, the Court, if it adheres to the spirit
of Reno, will almost certainly restrict the right of plaintiffs to sue the
owners of pornographic Web sites.
One way plaintiffs might attempt to get around the First Amendment's
protection of free expression is to characterize sexually explicit material
on Web sites as obscene, rather than merely pornographic, and thus subject
to greater regulation. The problem with this approach is that, at least under
traditional criteria, most pornographic material is not obscene.
Prohibitionists have attempted to overcome this problem by advocating a
shift from a test of obscenity that emphasizes the material's appeal to the
prurient interest and its patent offensiveness to one that focuses on the
material's depiction of women.
The inspiration for this novel view of pornography comes from the
work of feminist theorists like Andrea Dworkin 338 and Catherine
MacKinnon.339 These writers have concluded that pornography portrays
women in ways that are distorted and degrading and thereby contributes to
the subordination of women. 3'" Not only does pornography harm those
333. See id.
334. See id. at 885.

335. Id.
336. See id.

337. Id.
338. See generally ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981).

339. See generallyCATHERINE A. MACKINNoN, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); MacKinnon,
supra note 230.
340. See Meyer, supranote 301, at 1135 (observing that "[m]uch pornography, even when it
does not depict violence, portrays women in ways that are distorted and degrading").
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women who participate in the production of pomography,341 but, according
to these commentators, pornography also "celebrates, promotes, authorizes,
and legitimizes" such abuses against women as rape, spouse abuse, sexual
harassment, prostitution, and sexual child abuse. 42 Consequently, they
argue that material which depicts violence against women or portrays them
in a sexually submissive manner should be stripped of First Amendment
protection. 3 Free speech advocates however, contend that feminists want
to suppress pornography, not because it is sexually explicit, but because
they disapprove of what pornography has to say about women." To
suppress pornography solely on the basis of its ideological content,
however, seems to conflict with basic principles of First Amendment
jurisprudence. 5 Nevertheless, many scholars have supported the DworkinMacKinnon position.346
So far, the Dworkin-MacKinnon theory of pornography has not fared
very well in the courts. For example, a federal appellate court in American
Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut,347 struck down an anti-pornography
ordinance modeled along the lines suggested by Dworkin and MacKinnon.
341. See Sunstein, supra note 233, at 595 (observing that "pornography harms those women
who are coerced into and brutalized in the process of producing pornography").
342. MacKinnon, supra note 230, at 17.
343. See Marianne Wesson, Girls Should Bring Lawsuits Everywhere... Nothing Will Be
Corrupted:Pornographyas Speech and Product,60 U. CHi. L. REV. 845, 851-53 (1993) (arguing
that women harmed by pornography, as defined by Dworkin and MacKinnon, should be allowed
to recover damages from producers and distributors of pornographic material).
344. See Alan Harel, Bigotry, Pornography, and the First Amendment: A Theory of
UnprotectedSpeech, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1887, 1896 (1992) (pointing out that "[t]he subordination
of women in pornographic literature is an example of speech that may be characterized as nonpolitical but which clearly conveys political-ideological messages and values").
345. See Robin West, The Feminist-ConservativeAnti-PornographyAlliance and the 1986
Attorney General'sCommissiononPornographyReport,1987ABARES.J. 681,683 (stating that, The
standard liberfal view is that "pornography is a form of speech and therefore contributes to the cultural
dialogue, even if its propositions turn out to be false. We ought to let it flourish; we should give it full
First Amendment protection and then leave it alone.").
346. See Strosser, supra note 297, at 1107 (disclosing that "[t]he majority of law journal
publications concerning this issue since 1980 have supported the Dworkin-MacKinnon analysis and
endorsed censorship"). Advocates of Dworkin-MacKinnon approach argue that censorship is
justified because pornography undermines the credibility of women to such an extent that they
cannot effectively counteract the undesirable message that pornography disseminates. See John F.
Wirenius, Giving the Devil the Benefit ofLaw: Pornographers,the FeministAttackon FreeSpeech,
and the FirstAmendment,20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 27,57 (1992) (declaring that "[flor MacKinnon,
the conditions under which counter-speech can be effective do not exist because pornography
undermines women's credibility when they do speak and terrorizes them into not speaking at all");
Comment, Anti-PornographyLaws and FirstAmendment Values, 98 HARV. L. REV. 460,475-76
(1984) (stating that "because women have never acquired equal status, their rebuttal of
pornography's defamatory images is discounted, leaving them with no effective means of breaking
the cycle of stereotyping and discrimination").
347. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aft'd,475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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The ordinance, enacted by the City of Indianapolis, defined pornography
as the graphic depiction of the sexually explicit subordination of women
and declared it to be a form of illegal sex discrimination.348 The ordinance
provided that people could not "traffic" in pornography, "coerce" others
into performing in pornographic works or "force" pornography upon
unwilling individuals.349 Furthermore, the ordinance created a right of
action against the creators or sellers of pornographic works on behalf of
anyone who could claim to have been injured by a reader or viewer of
pornography.35
Shortly after the Indianapolis ordinance was passed, several media trade
associations challenged its constitutionality.35 ' A federal district agreed
with the plaintiffs and concluded that the ordinance violated the First
Amendment.5 2 On appeal, the court examined the ordinance's definition
of "pornography" and concluded that it was fatally defective.353 According
to the courts, the ordinance was invalid because it regulated solely on the
basis of viewpoint: sexually explicit depictions that "subordinated" women
were prohibited, while equally graphic material that portrayed women in
positions of equality (or perhaps even superiority) was not regulated by the
ordinance.35 4 The City claimed that pornography was not an idea, but an
injury, since it achieved the subordination of women by socialization rather
than by persuasion. s The court agreed that depictions of subordination
tended to perpetuate subordination and, in that respect, contributed to
discriminatory treatment of women.356 But, as the court pointed out, other
forms of speech affected public attitudes and behavior in the same manner
as pornography.357 The court declared that under the American
constitutional system, harmful speech must be tolerated for to do otherwise
would leave
the government in control of all of the institutions of
358
culture.
The City also contended that First Amendment protection should not
apply to ideas that could not be effectively challenged or rebutted by
opponents." 9 However, the court observed that the City's argument

348.
1984).
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

See American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1327 (S.D. Ind.
Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 325.
See id.
See id. at 326-27.
See Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1341-42.
See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 332.
See id. at 328.
See id. at 328; see also MacKinnon, supra note 230, at 17-18.
See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329.
See id.
See id. at 330.
See id.
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assumed that some ideas were inherently good and that some were
inherently bad, a principle that was contrary to established constitutional
doctrine. 36° In the court's view, the City's position would leave "the
government in control of all the institutions of culture, the great censor and
director of which thoughts are good for us."'36' Finally, the defendant
claimed that pornography, as defined by the ordinance, was like obscenity
and, therefore, could be regulated like other "low value" speech.362 The
court, however, disagreed with this characterization. It noted that sexually
explicit material would not be considered obscene unless it was utterly
without redeeming social value.363 Since the Indianapolis ordinance banned
sexually explicit speech solely on the basis of viewpoint, without any
consideration of its literary, artistic, political or scientific value,364 it would
365
undoubtedly suppress speech that was not obscene under the Millertest.
Although Hudnut was not a tort case, it did involve civil liability, since
the ordinance allowed injured parties to seek compensation through an
administrative hearing process. 66 Therefore, it would seem that the court's
reasoning in that case would be applicable if a tort claimant sought to
defeat an assertion of First Amendment protection of the defendant by
urging the court to treat pornography, as defined by Dworkin and
MacKinnon, as a form of low value speech. However, even if a court were
to adopt the Dworkin-MacKinnon approach in sexual abuse cases, it would
not help the victims of schoolyard violence since such violence is seldom
directed specifically at women. This suggests that plaintiffs who wish to
recover from the owners of sexually explicit Web sites will not be able to
characterize the material on such Web sites as obscene, but instead will
have to show that it incited viewers to violence.
2. Liability for the Dissemination of Violent Material
The plaintiffs in James v. Meow Media also contend that movie
producers and video game manufacturers should be held strictly liable for
disseminating material to the public that encourages or inspires violence
on the part of viewers. 367 Unlike obscenity, depictions of violence, along
with advocacy of violence in the abstract, are ordinarily protected by the

360. See id. at 331; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,339 (1974) (declaring
that "[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea").
361. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 331.
362. See id. at 331.
363. See id.
364. See id.
365. See id. at 331-32.
366. See id. at 326.
367. Complaint, 9[1 15w & 23w.
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First Amendment.368 Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster369 is
illustrative. In that case, a federal appellate court struck down a Missouri
statute which attempted to restrict access of violent video cassettes to
minors.370 Although the statute was apparently aimed at "slasher"
movies, its actual scope was much broader.372 The statute required video
dealers to keep violent videos in a separate area of the store and prohibited
their sale or rental to persons under the age of seventeen.373
The state conceded that depictions of violence were ordinarily protected
by the First Amendment, but argued that violent videos were obscene as
far as children were concerned and, therefore, could be regulated as long
as the regulation was rationally related to the state's objective of protecting
minors. 374 The court, however, rejected this argument, observing that
videos that contained violence, but not explicit sexual material, did
not
375
adults.
or
children
either
for
obscenity
of
definition
legal
the
meet
The state also contended that its interest in protecting children gave it
the power to determine what material children could see.37 6 The court,
however, noted that the statute was content-based and ruled that the state
had failed to show that the statute was narrowly tailored to advance an
articulated compelling governmental interest. 377 According to the court,
even if the state could demonstrate a compelling interest in restricting the
exposure of children to slasher movies, the statute covered many other
types of violence and, therefore, constituted an unwarranted infringement
upon other areas of protected speech. 378 The court also held that the statute
was unconstitutionally
vague because it did not adequately define the term
"violence. ' 379 Finally, the court concluded that the statute was

368. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 508 (1948); see also Eclipse Enter., Inc. v.
Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1997) (striking down county ordinance which restricted sale of
trading cards to minors which depicted heinous crimes or criminals); Sovereign News Co. v. Falke,
448 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Ohio 1977), remandedon other groundssub nom.Sovereign News Co. v.
Corrigan, 610 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1979).
369. 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992).
370. See id. at 691.
371. See Rozell, supra note 265, at 666.
372. The statute applied to videos which (1) had a tendency to appeal to morbid interests in
violence for persons under the age of seventeen, (2) depicted violence in a way which was patently
offensive to the average person, and (3) lacked serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
See Video Software, 968 F.2d at 687. In effect, the statute applied the Miller criteria for obscenity
to violence.
373. See id.
374. See id. at 688.
375. See id.
376. See id.
377. See id. at 689.
378. See id.

379. See id. at 689-90.
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unconstitutional because it imposed criminal liability upon dealers
regardless of whether or not they were aware of a video's contents.38° In the
court's view, this sort of criminal liability could unreasonably chill
" '
protected speech.38
Another federal court applied a similar analysis in Eclipse Enterprises,
Inc. v. Gulotta.3 82 Eclipse Enterprisesinvolved the validity of a county
ordinance which prohibited the sale of trading cards to any person under
the age of seventeen which depicted heinous crimes or criminals, and
which was harmful to minors.383 Like the ordinance in Video Software, the
term "harmful to minors" relied heavily on the Miller criteria.38 4 However,
unlike the Missouri statute, the ordinance in Eclipse Enterprisesimposed
criminal liability only when the seller was aware of the card's character or
content.385 The avowed purpose of the ordinance was to discourage
juvenile6 crime, which was allegedly stimulated by the sale of these trading
38
cards.

As in Video Software, the court first determined that the ordinance
regulated speech on the basis of its content, that is to say, the intent of the
ordinance was to suppress information contained in the trading cards
because the government thought it was harmful to minors.38 7 Once the
court found the ordinance to be content-based, it looked to see if the
ordinance was narrowly drawn and if it advanced a compelling
governmental interest. 388 The -court found that there was no empirical
evidence, other than studies of television violence, to suggest that sales of
crime-related trading cards harmed minors or contributed to juvenile
crime.389 Instead, the court concluded that the government had largely
relied on nonscientific testimony from community activists. 39 Nor did the
county attempt to regulate other descriptions of crime and criminals that
were similar to those found on the trading cards, thereby undercutting the
county's claim that depictions of crimes and criminals were a significant
social evil.39 ' Consequently, the court ruled that the ordinance did not
promote a compelling governmental interest and was, therefore, invalid.392

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

See id. at 690.
See id. at 690-91.
134 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1997).
See id. at 64.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 64-65.
See id. at 66-67.
See id. at 67.
See id. at 67-68.
See id. at 68.
See id.
See id.
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Video Software andEclipse Enterprisesindicate that violent expression
will be fully protected under the First Amendment. Accordingly, criminal
laws that attempt to regulate speech on the basis of its violent content will
be classified as content-based regulations and will be struck down unless
they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
There have been a number of tort cases where media defendants
claimed the protection of the First Amendment to immunize them from
liability for physical injuries caused by the dissemination of violent
material to teenage audiences. In most of these cases, the courts have relied
heavily on Brandenburg v. Ohio's incitement analysis.39 3 Under the
Brandenburgtest, the government may not suppress speech which inspires
violence unless it can show that the speaker explicitly advocates some sort
of unlawful action, that the speaker intended thereby to incite or.produce
such action, that there was a high likelihood that such unlawful action
would occur, and that the occurrence of such action was imminent.3 94
In Brandenburgv. Ohio,395 the Court held in favor of a Ku Klux Klan
leader who was convicted of violating Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute
for threatening violence at some indeterminate time in the future if the
federal government continued to support the social and political aspirations
of Blacks.396 The Court invalidated the Ohio statute because it punished the
mere advocacy of violence as opposed to the "incitement to imminent
lawless action. '397 The Court subsequently amplified the Brandenburg
holding in Hess v. Indiana.398 In Hess, the Court reversed the conviction of
a college student who was charged with disorderly conduct after
threatening to "take the fucking street back later" in response to police
efforts to clear the area of anti-war demonstrators. 399 According to the
Court, the defendant's remarks were constitutionally protected because
they were not intended to produce, and not likely to produce, imminent
disorder or violence. 4°
Most of the tort cases in which the Brandenburgstandard has invoked
401
402
or inspiration. 4°3 Rice v. Paladin
involve either facilitation," imitation,

393. See Sims, supra note 42, at 256 (observing that "[m]ost courts which have held that the
First Amendment barred negligence suits brought against media defendants have applied the rule
of Brandenburgv. Ohio").
394. See Sims, supra note 42, at 256.
395. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
396. See id. at 444-45.

397. Id. at 448-49.
398. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
399. Id. at 106-07.

400. See id. at 109.
401. See Rice v. Paladin Enter., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1515 (1998).
402. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Tex. 1983); see also Olivia
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Enterprises,Inc.4" provides a good example of a facilitation case. In Rice,
the relatives and personal representatives of three murder victims brought
suit against the publisher of HitMan:A TechnicalManualforIndependent
Contractors,an instruction manual for aspiring hit men. 45 The murderer,
James Perry, who was hired by Lawrence Horn, the ex-husband of one of
the victims, faithfully followed the advice and instructions provided in the
defendant's book.406 The publisher, Paladin Enterprises not only agreed
that it knew that its book would be used by murderers, but actually
admitted that it intended to provide assistance to them. °7 Even so, Paladin
contended that the publication of its book was still protected as a matter of
law by the First Amendment. 4"' While acknowledging that the publisher
was free to advocate lawless behavior in the abstract, the court concluded
that Brandenburg'simminence requirement was not applicable because
Paladin's conduct went beyond the mere advocacy of unlawful conduct,
and amounted to active assistance in the performance of a criminal act.4°
Furthermore, the court reasoned that because First Amendment concerns
did not prohibit the government from imposing criminal sanctions on those
who aided and abetted criminals, it should not preclude civil damage
awards against such individuals either. 10
Finally, the court rejected the argument that tort liability would chill
lawful speech. 411 According to the court, liability in this case was
predicated upon Paladin's admitted knowledge that readers would use the
book to help them commit crimes and its intent that they should do So.412
According to the court, few publishers would be so foolish as to admit

N v. National Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied sub noma.; Niemi
v. National Broad. Co., 458 U.S. 1108 (1982); DeFilippo v. National Broad. Co., 446 A.2d 1036
(R.I. 1982).
403. See Waller v. Osborne, 763 F. Supp. 1144 (M.D. Ga. 1991), aff'd, 958 F.2d 1084 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied,506 U.S. 916 (1992); see also McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct.
App. 1982); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989); Byers v.
Edmondson, 712 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1143 (1999).
404. 128 F. 3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1515 (1998).
405. The author of this revealing text prudently published under the pseudonym, "Rex Feral,"
instead of using his (or her) real name. See Davidson, supra note 13, at 240.
406. See Rice, 128 F.2d at 239. One of the victims, Lawrence Horn's eight-year old
quadriplegic son, was the beneficiary of a $2 million trust fund; Any money left in the trust at the
death of his son and ex-wife was to go to Mr. Horn. Horn decided to expedite matters by hiring
Perry to kill his ex-wife and child. See id.
407. See id. at 242.
408. See id. at 241.
409. See id. at 246-47.
410. See id.at 247.
411. See id. at 265-67.
412. See id. at 265.
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such things in the future.413 The court confidently predicted that
descriptions of criminal acts, no matter how explicit, in news reports would
not result in liability because newscasters would not have the requisite
intent to break the law.414 Even the publishers of instruction manuals for
hit men could escape liability in most instances since knowledge on the
part of the publisher that such information might be misused for criminal
purposes would not be enough to support liability under the court's
analysis.415
A number of imitation cases have also employed a Brandenburg
analysis to protect publishers from liability.41 6 Olivia N v. National
Broadcasting Co. 4 17 is illustrative. In that case, a young girl sued a
television network for the broadcast of a film drama entitled "Born
Innocent."4 8 The plaintiff was attacked on a public beach by a group of
teenage thugs who imitated an "artificial rape" scene which been portrayed
on the show several days previously.4" 9 The plaintiff argued that the court
should adopt a negligence standard rather than Brandenburg's more
rigorous incitement approach.420
The California court observed that movies and television broadcasts
were normally protected by the First Amendment. 42 ' It also rejected a
negligence approach and declared that "[i]ncitement is the proper test
here."'422 The court adhered to the stricter Brandenburgstandard because
it determined that "television networks would become significantly more
inhibited in the selection of controversial materials if liability were to be
imposed on a simple negligence theory."423 Since the plaintiff had not
alleged that the television show intended to encourage others to commit
sexual assaults, the court concluded that the incitement requirement had
not been satisfied.42 4 The court also distinguished FCC v. Pacifica
425 which had upheld FCC regulations against the broadcast of
Foundation,
indecent, but not obscene, material in order to protect children. The court
413. See id. at 265-66.
414. See id. at 266.
415. See id.
416. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802,804-05 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Olivia
N v. National Broad. Sys., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied sub nom.,
Niemi v. National Broad. Co., 458 U.S. 1108(1982); DeFilippo v. NBC, 446 A.2d 1036, 1040 (R.I.
1982).
417. 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
418. See id. at 890.
419. See id. at 890-91.
420. See id. at 891.
421. See id. at 892.
422. Id. at 893.
423. Id. at 892.
424. See id. at 892-93.
425. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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found that the holding in Pacificaapplied only to the government's power
and should not be expanded to cover depictions of
to regulate indecency
426
violent conduct.
Several courts have also relied on a Brandenburg analysis to protect
publishers against tort liability in inspiration cases.427 One such case was
McCollum v. CBS, Inc.,428 which involved the celebrated musician, Ozzy
Osborne. The music of Mr. Osborne and other heavy metal musicians
tended to focus on such unwholesome themes as hate, sex, rebellion,
violence and suicide,429 with occasional digressions into sexual perversion,
necrophilia and satanism.430 One of Osborne's songs, "Suicide Solution,"
suggested that suicide might be an acceptable way for some people to deal
with the vicissitudes of life.431 John McCollum, shot and killed himself
while listening to Osborne's music. 432 The decedent's parents alleged that
Osborne's music was intentionally fashioned to appeal to teenage misfits
and, therefore, the producers and distributors of Osborne's music should
have known that some of them might take Osborne's advice and commit
suicide.433
The court began its analysis of the plaintiffs' claim by observing that
the First Amendment protected all forms of artistic expression, including
musical lyrics.4 " The issue, therefore, was whether Osborne's music could
be characterized as "speech which is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and which is likely to incite or produce such
action. 4 35 According to the court, the Brandenburgstandard required that:
(1) Osborne's music be directed and intendedtoward the goal of bringing
about the imminent suicide of listeners; and (2) that his music be likely to
produce such a result.436 In other words, the plaintiffs could not prevail
merely by proving that McCollum's suicide was a foreseeable reaction to
Osborne's music; they also had to show that their son's suicide was a
426. See id. at 894.
427. See Waller v. Osborne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1150-51 (M.D. Ga. 1991), aff'd, 958 F.2d
1084 (1 lth Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 916 (1992); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187,
193 (Col. Ct. App. 1988); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067, 1071-72
(Mass. 1989); Byers v. Edmondson, 712 So. 2d 681,689 (La. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 1143 (1999).
428. 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
429. See Block, supra note 8,at 783-85.
430. See Holt, supra note 226, at 58 (observing that "[m]uch of this music promotes themes
of extreme rebellion, violence, substance abuse, sexual perversion, necrophilia, suicide and

satanism").
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

See McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
See id. at 189.
See id. at 190-91.
See id. at 192.
Id. at 193 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
See id. at 193.
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specifically intended consequence. 437 Not surprisingly, this proved to be an
impossible standard for the plaintiffs to meet.
The court could find no explicit command in the lyrics of Osborne's
songs, including "Suicide Solution," to commit suicide in the immediate
future or at any other specific time.43 According to the court, the lyrics
were nothing more than a form of artistic expression that were not intended
to be taken literally and which would not be interpreted as an incitement
to suicide by any reasonable person.439 The court also declared that music
that focused on the darker side of human nature or evoked a mood of
depression could not be characterized as a direct incitement to imminent
violence." 0 Finally, the court concluded that Osborne had no duty to
modify his lyrics in order to prevent harm to a small group of emotionally
troubled listeners. 44 ' According to the court, to impose such a duty upon
performers would "quickly have the effect of reducing and limiting their
artistic expression to only the broadest standard of taste and acceptance and
the lowest level of offense, provocation and controversy."442
The Brandenburg standard was also employed in Byers v.
Edmondson,"3 a recent case involving Oliver Stone's controversial movie
NaturalBorn Killers. The plaintiff in that case, Patsy Byers, was shot and
seriously wounded during an armed robbery at the convenience store where
she worked. 4" In her suit against the producers and distributors of Natural
Born Killers,Ms. Byers alleged that the robbers had gone on a crime spree
after repeatedly viewing the film." 5 The plaintiff argued that the
defendants should be held liable for negligence because they knew or
should have known that a film which glorified criminal violence and
portrayed criminal psychopaths as heros and celebrities would inspire other
people to commit violent acts. 446 Furthermore, Byers claimed that the
defendants intended for the film's viewers to imitate some of the violent
scenes in the film." 7 The trial court dismissed the suit and Ms. Byers
appealed. 448
As in McCollum, the court in Byers court began with an
acknowledgment that motion pictures were protected by the First

437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.

See id.
Seeid.
See id.
See id. at 194.
See id. at 197.
Id.
712 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1143 (1999).
See id. at 683.
See id. at 684.
See id.
See id. at 687.
See id. at 685-86.
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Amendment to the same extent as other forms of expression. "9 Invoking
the Brandenburg standard, the court proceeded to consider whether the
defendant's conduct amounted to an incitement to imminent criminal
activity.45 ° The court noted that mere knowledge on the part of the
defendants that the movie might trigger criminal misconduct by third
parties was not enough to constitute incitement.4"' At the same time,
relying on Rice v. PaladinEnterprises,Inc.,452 the court concluded that the
defendants could be held liable under an incitement theory if the plaintiff
could prove that they intentionally urged viewers to imitate the criminal
conduct of the main characters in the film.453 Since the court was required
to accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true for purposes of reviewing
the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiffs claim, it felt compelled to
reverse the trial court and allow Byers to prove the existence of intent at
trial.454 This decision was technically correct, but it allowed the plaintiffs
to take their case forward to the discovery stage of the trial process by
alleging the existence of intent, even though there was no credible
evidence to support such an allegation.
C. Conclusion
Unless existing constitutional standards are changed, there seems little
chance that the courts will impose tort liability on those who disseminate
sexually explicit or violent material. So far, the distinction between
obscene material and sexually explicit protected speech remains a
cornerstone of First Amendmentjurisprudence, notwithstanding the efforts
of feminists and religious fundamentalists to persuade courts that some of
this material should be demoted to an unprotected category of expression.
Likewise, attempts by the government to restrict access to sexually explicit
speech on the Internet under the guise of protecting children have met with
failure. While no one knows what the future will bring, for the time being,
government attempts to regulate sexually explicit material on the Internet
have been unsuccessful. In light of the acknowledged ability of tort liability
to chill protected speech, it is unlikely that the courts will allow private
individuals to recover damages from the owners of pornographic Web sites
as long as they make reasonable efforts to prevent minors from viewing
sexually explicit material on such sites.
Those who claim to have been injured by the portrayal of violent

449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.

See id. at 689.
See id. at 689-90.
See id. at 691.
128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
See Byers, 712 So. 2d at 688.
See id. at 691-92.
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material in movies or video games are also unlikely to prevail as long as
most courts rely on the Brandenburg standard.455 First of all, plaintiffs
must point to specific words or acts by the publisher that directly incite
others to engage in violent acts. However, while movies and video games
often portray violent conduct, they almost never expressly urge viewers to
commit violent acts.45 6 Second, the plaintiff must show that the publisher
intended to cause violence.4 7 This requires a subjective desire on the part
of the defendant to cause violence or knowledge that violence was
substantially certain to result.458 The mere possibility, or even the
probability, that some violent acts might occur will not satisfy this
requirement."s Finally, liability may only be imposed upon a publisher for
speech that threatens imminent harm. 4 The imminence requirement would
be difficult to satisfy in situations where a viewer is subjected to violent

455. See Davidson, supra note 13, at 279 (declaring that "the 'incitement' standard under
Brandenburgis an extremely difficult one to satisfy"); see also Laura W. Brill, Note, The First
Amendment and the Powerof Suggestion: Protecting"Negligent" Speakers in Cases of Imitative
Harm, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 984,987-88 (1994) (pointing out how difficult it is for plaintiffs to show
that harm to them was likely, imminent or intended).
456. See Diamond & Primm, supra note 180, at 972 (observing that "[m]ost media portrayals
do not involve direct advocacy of unlawful conduct, but will only indirectly incite someone to
action"); see also Prettyman & Hook, supra note 22, at 375 (declaring that "whereas verbal
statements may directly incite others to violence, visual portrayals can only show violent conduct,
i.e., they can only indirectly advocate unlawful acts").
457. See Smith, supra note 216, at 1203 (declaring that [u]nder the Brandenburgincitement
standard, the speaker must intend to produce the activity"). But see Hilker, supra note 217, at 570
(arguing that "[t]he 'directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action' language of
Brandenburgneed not-and should not-be construed to require more than negligence on the part
of the media defendant in determining liability for imitative violence").
458. See Michael P. Kopech, Comment, Shouting "Incitement!" in the Courtroom: An
Evolving Theory of Civil Liability?, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 173, 184 (1987) (stating that "[i]ntent
indicates a purpose on the part of the actor to procure the consequences of his act, but extends as
well to the consequences that the actor knows are substantially certain to follow").
459. See Campbell, supra note 220, at 440 (stating that "[i]ncitement implies that a high
probability of danger is intended by the speaker, whileforeseeabilityalso incorporates unintended
consequences").
460. See Hentoff, supranote 277, at 1458 (contending that "[n]o matter how serious a harm
is, if the harm is not imminent, speech cannot be regulated under the [Brandenburg] test"). The
imminence requirement is apparently based on the notion the government should be allowed to
restrict speech only when an audience might be emotionally swayed by thespeaker and would have
no time for discussion or reflection. See Harry Wellington, On Freedomof Expression, 88 YALE
L.J. 1105, 1141 (1979) (declaring that"[i]f there is no time for discussion through talk, a clear and
present danger test-or a similar test by any other name-is appropriate"); Hilker, supra note 217,
at 570 (pointing out that "[t]he required temporal relationship between the communication and the
alleged resultant unlawful act forces analysis of whether the advocacy in question was so closely
related in time to the harmful action that when the supposedly protected speech was made it was
clear that 'more speech' could not have prevented the harm").
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material over a long period of time rather than responding immediately to
a specific stimulus.
IV. LiABirrY ISSUES

A. Three Liability Standards
This portion of the Article looks at three liability standards under which
personal injury claims against media publishers might be adjudicated. The
first liability standard is based on strict products liability. Under this
approach, injured parties would be allowed to sue under a defective
product theory and media publishers would not be permitted to claim any
First Amendment protection. The second standard employs negligence
principles. Under such a regime, plaintiffs would be required to show that
a publisher failed to exercise due care, but defendants would be foreclosed
from avoiding liability on First Amendment grounds. The third alternative
would essentially retain the liability standard that currently applies to book
publishers, recording companies and movie producers and would extend
this standard to all other media publishers.
1. Strict Liability
This liability standard would be most favorable to victims' interests.
Under a strict liability approach, the traditional product, sale and defect
requirements of products liability law would be relaxed so that those who
commercially disseminate information or ideas embodied in books,
magazines, records, CDs, movies, radio or television broadcasts, video
cassettes, computer programs, or who make information or ideas available
to the public over the Internet, would be potentially subject to liability as
product sellers. Media defendants would not be able to defeat strict liability
by raising defenses based on First Amendment privilege; however, they
could still defeat liability by raising cause-in-fact or proximate cause
issues.
A strict liability standard would probably work best in a case where the
plaintiff's claim is based on the publication's information content. Since
the focus is on the condition of the product, not the manufacturer's conduct
in a strict liability case,46 ' liability would depend almost entirely on

461. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 883 (Alaska 1979) (declaring that
"[t]he focus of strict products liability is on the condition of the product, not on the manufacturing
and marketing decision of the defendant"); see also Jackson v. Harsco Corp., 673 P.2d 363, 365
(Colo. 1983) (stating that "the focus is upon the nature of the product, and the consumer's
reasonable expectations with regard to that product"); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d
955, 958 (Md. 1976) (contending that "[t]he relevant inquiry in a strict liability action focuses not
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whether the published material was accurate or not. Presumably, in such
cases, it would not matter that the defendant could not have discovered the
error by means of reasonable inspection. Thus, if a strict liability standard
were adopted, book companies that published another's work would be
held strictly liable to consumers for any affirmative statements that caused
physical harm.462 Retail sellers would also be subject to liability even
though they could not realistically verify the accuracy of the books they
sold.463 Moreover, claims would not need to be limited to the publication
of inaccurate information; consumers who were injured because of
ambiguous information, or even omissions, could also sue just as they do
in inadequate warning cases.464
However, it would be difficult to apply strict liability principles to
claims based on a publication's idea or expressive content. Perhaps, a court
would hold a defendant strictly liable if the publication's message was
sufficiently dangerous or anti-social that it could be classified as
"defective." The problem with this approach, however, is that it would give
courts and juries the power to censor unpopular ideas or publishers.
Another alternative would be to reduce the liability issue solely to one of
causation. Thus, if the plaintiff could prove that the defendant's message,
whatever it was, facilitated or inspired a viewer or listener to injure himself
or another, the publisher would be required to compensate the victim.
Although this standard would be broader than the first alternative, at least
liability would not depend on a court or jury's evaluation of the
publication's viewpoint or content.
The principal benefit of a strict liability standard is that it would make
it easier for those injured by speech-inspired violence to obtain
compensation for their injuries. Since liability would be limited to
commercial publishers, these defendants could, at least in theory, spread
losses through insurance or the pricing mechanism much the way other
commercial enterprises do.465 Not only would a strict liability standard
ensure that losses did not fall solely upon individual victims, it would
provide a financial incentive for publishers to exercise a greater degree of

on the conduct of the manufacturer but rather on the product itself').
462. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991) (book publisher
made no attempt to check accuracy of statement by authors that a certain mushroom was safe to
eat); Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publishers, Inc., 833 P.2d 70 (Haw. 1992) (no independent
verification by travel book company of statement by author that it was safe to body surf at Kekaha
Beach).
463. See Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (suit against retail seller
of cookbook).
464. See id. at 1054 (author who discussed how to cook Dasheen root failed to warn that raw
Dasheen root was poisonous).
465. See Lane, supra note 139, at 1180 (contending that "the publisher can spread the costs
of its liability among users of the material as a whole").
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care and social responsibility. At the very least, the prospect of strict
liability would cause media publishers to check the accuracy of some of the
factual information that they distribute to the reading public. 466 A strict
liability standard might also induce publishers to exercise more restraint
in disseminating material to younger audiences that might encourage
violence.
2. A Negligence Standard
A number of legal scholars have advocated that media defendants be
subject to liability when they negligently cause physical injury to others.467
They point out that negligence is often employed as a basis for liability for
oral or written statements, such as defamation or misrepresentation, that
cause harm to others. If a negligence standard were adopted, the liability
of media defendants would be determined by balancing the utility of the
particular expression against the likelihood that viewers, listeners, or
innocent third parties would be harmed, as well as the gravity of such
harm.46 8 If the utility of the defendant's conduct did not outweigh the harm
it caused, the court would impose liability for negligence and the defendant
would not be able to invoke any constitutional privilege.
This approach would be similar to that followed in defamation cases
involving private figures.469 In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 470 the Court
declared that a plaintiff could not recover against a media defendant in a
libel action unless he or she could show that the defendant's conduct was
negligent." The negligence standard in Gertzrepresents abalance between
the interest of plaintiffs in their good reputation and the First Amendment
interest of media publishers. Although defendants could still invoke
common-law absolute and qualified privileges, they could not make

466. See Terri R. Day, Publicationsthat Incite, Solicit, or Instruct: PublisherResponsibility
or CaveatEmptor?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73, 91 (1995) (arguing that "[a] rule that requires
publishers to police their ads more carefully may be an incentive to create more social responsibility
among publishers without chilling First Amendment speech").
467. See Nancy L. Miller, Comment, Media Liabilityfor Injuries that Resultfrom Television
Broadcasts to ImmatureAudiences, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 377, 381 (1985) (declaring that "[t]he
broadcaster should not be immunized from liability exposure if an innocent victim has been injured
as a direct result of a negligent broadcast"); Smith, supra note 216, at 120-21 (arguing that
"[c]arefully applied traditional negligence theory, balancing the interests of plaintiffs and
defendants on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis, will provide for the imposition of liability in appropriate

circumstances without threatening the protections of free speech").
468. See Sims, supra note 42, at 280-92 (proposing a balancing test which also includes First
Amendment interests).
469. See Diamond & Pimm, supra note 180, at 981 (pointing out that "writings and oral
communications may often expose one to a negligence action").
470. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
471. See id. at 349.
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additional First Amendment claims once the plaintiff has met the
applicable liability standard, be it negligence or actual malice.
A negligence standard might work satisfactorily in cases based on a
publication's information content. Under this approach, a publisher would
be required to take reasonable steps to ensure the completeness and
accuracy of its information, but would not be expected to achieve
perfection. For example, a standard of due care might require a chart maker
to ensure that its charts accurately depicted the data provided to it by the
federal government, but it might not hold the chart maker liable for failing
to independently verify the accuracy of this data. Likewise, under a
negligence standard, publishers of cookbooks and travel guides might be
held liable for deficiencies in the editing process and for failing to catch
obvious errors, but they would not be expected to check the factual
accuracy of manuscripts submitted to them for publication. However, a
negligence standard appears to be less workable in cases based on a
publication's viewpoint or idea content. A negligence standard works
tolerably well in speech cases when defendant's statements can be proved
or disproved; many ideas and viewpoints, however, are inherently capable
of proof.472 Therefore, the only thing a court could do would be to balance
the social benefits of an idea or point of view against its social costs. As a
practical matter, such an exercise would be highly impracticable.
3. A Modified BrandenburgStandard
A third alternative is to retain some version of the Brandenburg
standard. According to Brandenburg,speech that encourages or inspires
unlawful acts is fully protected unless it can be shown that the speaker
intended to incite unlawful actions, that there was a high likelihood that
such actions would occur, and that the occurrence of such actions was
imminent.473 One advantage of this approach is that it reflects the current
state of the law and courts are already familiar with it. However, as some
legal scholars have pointed out, the Brandenburg standard, which was
developed to review state sedition and criminal syndicalism laws, 4 is not
well suited for use in civil cases involving personal injuries. 475 In

472. See Brill, supra note 17, at 984 (arguing that depictions or portrayals of violence "are
more like opinions or moral arguments"); Hilker, supra note 217, at 554 (declaring that "[i]n
contrast to false statements of fact, however, media portrayals can constitute the communication of
ideas").
473. See Sims, supra note 42, at 256.
474. See Coletti,supra note 226, at 440 (pointing out that "[t]he incitement doctrine originated
as a response to the criminal syndicalism acts of the 1930s and the 1950s").
475. See Sims, supra note 42, at 262 (arguing that the Brandenburg standard is "conceptually
inappropriate as applied to the majority of the media physical injury cases"); see also Lane, supra
note 139, at 1167 (contending that the incitement requirement "developed in the context of
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particular, Brandenburg'simminence requirement does not seem very
relevant to the question of whether media publishers should be held civilly
liable for the crimes of homicidal teenagers.
On the other hand, it is difficult to think of an acceptable substitute for
the Brandenburg standard. One possibility would be to implement an
actual malice standard, such as that applied to defamation claims by public
officials as a result of New York Times v. Sullivan. However, the New York
Times standard requires subjective knowledge or reckless disregard of a
statement's truth or falsity; arguably, this approach is not appropriate when
viewpoints or opinions are involved since they are not inherently true or
false. Another possibility would be recognize a privilege similar to the
absolute privilege that applies in defamation cases for statements made in
judicial or legislative proceedings.
Perhaps, the best approach may be to require the plaintiff in media
defendant cases to prove that the published material was intended to incite
viewers or listeners to commit violent or illegal acts, and that such material
directly caused a viewer or listener to commit the act that caused the harm
in question. In order to satisfy this standard, plaintiff would have to show
that the media defendant directed, urged or commanded viewers or
listeners to commit violence. Merely depicting, condoning or approving of
violent behavior would not be enough to establish liability. On the other
hand, Brandenburg's imminence requirement need not be retained.
Although the passage of time between the actor's exposure to a particular
publication and the commission of a criminal act might be relevant to the
causation issue, it would not be a formal element of the liability standard.
B. The Benefits of Limited Liabilityfor Media Defendants
A limited liability standard, such as that proposed above, would achieve
three objectives: (1) it would maximize the benefits of free expression; (2)
it would discourage lawsuits by those who wish to use the tort system to
advance their own political agendas; and (3) it would focus public attention
on those who actually commit violent acts instead of shifting blame to
others.
1. Encouragement of Free Expression
Free expression provides important benefits to society.47 6 This is so

determining the constitutionality of criminal statutes condemning overtly political speech that
advocated lawless action; it has never concerned private actions based on tort law").
476. For example, the First Amendment's protection of free speech allows individuals to fully
exercise their rights as citizens by exchanging information and comments about their government
without fear of interference by public officials. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555,587 (1980); Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,390 (1969); David Logan, TortLawand
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even though much of it is vulgar, hateful, and on occasion, downright
stupid. However, our society tolerates "bad" speech because it does not
want the government to decide what expression is suitable for public
consumption and what is not. Instead, we assume that individuals are
capable of making rational decisions based on exposure to an open
competition of ideas, opinions and information. 4' The assumption is that
the Central Meaning of the FirstAmendment, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV. 493,497 (1990) (arguing that
"political speech-speech about matters of self-governing importance-is the essence of our
democratic system and deserves the full protection of the first amendment"). Free expression also
serves as a "safety valve" for society by allowing those who are displeased with the existing state
of affairs to blow off steam. Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First
Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (1982)
(declaring that "the first amendment helps to achieve a stable society by providing cathartic
opportunity to those who are displeased with society"). Furthermore, free expression promotes
individual autonomy in various ways. The act of speaking itself can be a significant exercise of
personal autonomy. See C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 CAL. L. REV. 979,
980 (1997). In addition, free expression fosters independentjudgment by providing individuals with
access to competing ideas and viewpoints. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1944); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 143 (1989)
(observing that "[b]y affording people the opportunity to hear and digest competing positions and
to explore options in conversations with others, freedom of discussion is thought to promote
independent judgment and considerate decision, what might be characterized as autonomy");
Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Courtand CommercialSpeech: New Wordswith an Old Message,
72 MINN. L. REV. 289, 291 (1987) (declaring that "[t]he first amendment assumes that access to
information facilitates personal autonomy in decision making because individuals are free to choose
ideas from many, diverse sources"). Finally, free expression is essential to an individual's moral and
emotional development. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,534
n.2 (1980) (pointing out that the First Amendment "protects the individual's interest in selfexpression"). This is based on the notion that "[a]n individual's 'mental' processes cannot be
limited to the receipt and digestion of cold, hard theories and facts, for there is also an emotional
element that is uniquely human.... Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 591, 628 (1982). "Nonrational" forms of communication, such as art and music, are
particularly important to this emotional development. Id.
477. See Jonathan M. Hoffman, From Random House to Mickey Mouse: Liability for
Negligent PublishingandBroadcasting,21 TORT & INS. L.J. 65, 81 (1985) (asserting that "[t]he
basic assumption of our form of government is that each citizen in a free society is deemed to have
the judgment and responsibility to decide which theories and ideas to accept, not because we
assume that everyone will exercise that judgment wisely or responsibly, but that we are, on the
whole, far better off leaving these matters to the marketplace of ideas than to legislature, judge, or
jury"); Martin H. Redish, TobaccoAdvertisingand the FirstAmendment,81 IOWAL. REV. 589,636
(1996) (declaring that "the fundamental premise of the First Amendment-indeed, of the very
democratic system of which the First Amendment is such an important part-is that citizens must
be trusted to make their own lawful choices on the basis of a free and open competition of ideas,
opinions and information"); Wirenius, supra note 346, at 67 (observing that, "The very nature of
a democratic-republican form of government is that the people are presumed to be capable of selfrule. And in order to be capable of self-rule, as indicated before, people must be able to distinguish
between good and evil, true and false, wisdom and prudence. If the people-as individuals-are not
able to make personal decisions about reading or viewing, how can they be assumed to be able to
choose representatives, and make difficult and key policy decisions.").
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truth will ultimately prevail over error.478 While there is reason to believe
that marketplace of ideas does not always live up to popular
expectations, 479 it continues to provide a powerful justification for the
protection of free speech.48 °
At the same time, there is good reason to suspect that tort actions
against media publishers will chill protected speech. 48 1 A chilling effect
occurs when the fear of legal liability causes publishers to shy away from
expressing legitimate, but controversial, ideas or viewpoints.482 Of course,

478. See Kenneth L. Karst,EqualityasaCentralPrinciplein the FirstAmendment,43 U. CH.
L. REV. 20 (1975) (declaring that "[t]he advancement of knowledge depends on unfettered
competition between today's prevailing opinions and those opinions that may come to prevail
tomorrow").
479. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1,
7 (declaring that "[o]n the whole, current and historical trends have not vindicated the market
model's faith in the rationality of the human mind"); see also Redish, supra note 476, at 1162
(observing that"the basic assumption that exposure to the so-called 'false' speech will help society
to discover and appreciate 'true' speech is empirically dubious"); David A. Strauss, Persuasion,
Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 349 (1991) (stating that "[n]o

matter how we define the ground rules, there is no theory that explains why competition in the
realm of ideas will systematically produce good or truthful or otherwise desirable outcomes").
480. See Gertz v. RobertWelch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,339-40 (1974) (observing that "[h]owever
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and
juries but on the competition of other ideas"); see alsoRed Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969) (declaring that "it is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited market
place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail"); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673
(1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that "[t]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market").
481. See Mike Quinlan & Jim Persels, Jt'sNotMyFault,the Devil Made Me Do It:Attempting
to Impose Tort Liability on Publishers,Producers,and Artistsfor InjuriesAllegedly "Inspired"

by Media Speech, 18 So. IL.U. L.J. 417,437 (1994) (arguing that'"tort liability cannot, consistent
with the First Amendment, be imposed on those in the communicative industries for harms
allegedly 'inspired' by media speech"); see also Bayman, supra note 153, at 578 (observing that
"[i]deas are not commercial products, and imposing strict liability on those who distribute
information would have a chilling effect on first amendment freedoms"); Brill, supra note 17, at
1038 (contending that "[m]edia liability for third-party acts is likely to result in considerable selfcensorship because speakers will be unable to predict which speech acts will subject them to
liability); Scott A. Hampton, Casenote, Anatomy of a Suicide: Media LiabilityforAudience Acts
of Violence, 9 LOY. ENT. L.J. 95, 108 (1989) (maintaining that "[t]he threat of criminal or civil

liability on artists, producers and distributers stifles creativity and expression"); Lane, supra note
139, at 1155 (concluding that the imposition of tort liability on publishers "might have deleterious
short-term effects, restraining the flow of published materials"); Brett L. Myers, Note, Read at Your
Own Risk: PublisherLiabilityfor Defective How-To Books, 45 ARK. L. REV. 699, 716 (1992)

(stating that "[t]he judicial stance against finding publishers liable is based upon a concern about
the chilling effect such liability would have on the free flow of ideas").
482. See Hampton, supra note 481, at 104 (stating that "[a] chilling effect results when
recording artists and distributors fear legal liability and become reluctant to disseminate
controversial or questionable matter").
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criminal sanctions can also chill constitutionally protected speech,4" 3 but
the prospect of civil liability often presents an even greater threat to free
expression."' The Court recognized this in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan485 when it held that the imposition of liability under common-law
libel principles should be characterized as state action, and therefore,
subject to First Amendment limitations.486
There are two aspects of tort liability that are especially troublesome.
One is the flawed nature of the adjudicatory process and the other is the
extent of the publisher's potential financial exposure when many persons
are injured by a single distribution. Media defendants are rightly concerned
about the adjudicatory process. As we have seen, the concept of "defect"
provides little guidance to publishers as to what sort of material to avoid.487
The negligence standard also fails to provide much enlightenment to
publishers about their potential liability.48 The problem of vague liability
rules is exacerbated by the propensity of some jurors to behave
irresponsibly unless properly supervised by the trial judge. In particular,
publishers of controversial or sexually explicit material have good reason
to fear that juries will act as moral censors, rather than as fact finders,
when personal injury cases are tried.489
Another problem with tort liability is the possibility of large numbers
of damage claims arising from a single publication. The more widely a
publication is disseminated, the greater the publisher's exposure to tort
liability.49° Thus, publishers who typically reach mass audiences run the

483. See Dombroski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,494 (1965).
484. See Brill, supranote 17, at 1015-24 (discussing the differing effects of criminal and civil
liability on the exercise of free speech rights). But see Smith, supra note 216, at 1193 (arguing that
"[p]unishing speech itself presents a greater danger to the first amendment than allowing liability
in negligence for the harm resulting from the speech").
485. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In that case, the Court declared that "[t]he fear of damage awards
under a rle such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly more inhibiting than
the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute." Id. at 277.
486. See id. at 265.
487. Forexample, would the publisherof a modem edition of Shakespeare's Romeo andJuliet
be potentially liable for the suicides of star-crossed teenage lovers? See Meyer, supra note 301
(describing such a possible scenario).
488. See Davidson, supra note 13, at 306 (declaring, "In short, for the mass media, an
'incitement' theory does not pose a great potential danger. But negligence is a different matter.
While incitement requires 'intent,' which is difficult to prove, negligence merely requires
'foreseeability'-determined, one might say, with twenty-twenty hindsight."); Diamond & Primm,
supra note 180, at 993 (arguing that "[w]here the media defendant does not intend to elicit a
behavior, but merely to convey ideas, negligence theory is insufficient to protect unpopular views
and is therefore offensive to first amendment values").
489. See Brill, supra note 17, at 1031 (observing that "[t]he juror's view of the utility of the
speech will most likely vary in direct proportion to her or his fondness for the message").
490. See Sims, supra note 42, at 273-41.

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

risk of being sued by a potentially large, but indeterminate, number of
claimants. 491 This raises the risk that publishers, such as movie producers,
record companies and television networks, who are more susceptible to
this risk of massive liability, will tend to avoid discussing controversial
subjects such as violent crime, mental illness, suicide, child abuse, or
spouse abuse.
2. Discouragement of Ideologically-Motivated Litigation
The primary objective of tort litigation should be to compensate injured
parties so they can get on with their lives. Unfortunately, these days some
lawsuits seem to be more concerned about punishing defendants than
compensating plaintiffs. For example, Jack Thompson, one of the
plaintiffs' lawyers in James v. Meow Media was quoted as saying "We
intend to hurt Hollywood. We intend to hurt the video game industry. We
intend to hurt sex porn sites on the Internet.' 492 Russ Herman, a plaintiff's
attorney in Castanov. American Tobacco Co., 93 in an unsuccessful class
action brought on behalf of all nicotine-dependent persons in the United
States, exclaimed that "we want to ...kill a dragon."494 Commenting on
a lawsuit his organization was planning to bring against gun manufacturers,
NAACP president Kweisi Mfume declared that "we will be filing litigation
against the gun industry in an effort to break the backs of those who help
perpetuate the sale of weapons in our communities.' 9 Of course, some of
these statements may be nothing more than empty rhetoric. Nevertheless,
they suggest that some plaintiffs and their lawyers believe that they have
a moral duty to seriously cripple or destroy commercial enterprises they
believe are evil.
That is not to say that tort law cannot be used for vindicatory purposes.
Lawsuits do provide a forum for victims to tell their story and seek support

491. See Bayman, supra note 153, at 576 (arguing that the prospect of strict tort liability
"would discourage authors from writing and publishers from publishing because of a fear of
exposure to liability from the vast number of plaintiffs that foreseeably would have access to their
publications in the mass market"); see also Brill, supra note 17, at 1027-28 (observing that "if
courts were to recognize a negligence cause of action in mimicry cases, the defendants could be
subject to liability for harms to a large and unidentifiable class of people"); Lane, supra note 139,
at 1170 (observing that"(t]he unbounded dissemination of television broadcasts may frighten courts
from imposing liability because of the vast, and sometimes indeterminate, class of potential
plaintiffs").
492. Game Companies Sued for Violence, GAME NEWS, CNET Gamecenter.com,

<http:llgcl.gamecenter.comnews/item/0%2C3%2CO-266 6%2COO.html> (visited Apr. 13, 1999).

493. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
494. Myron Levin, As Tobacco LitigationGoes, CastanoSuitisSuperBowl,L.A.TIMES, May
22, 1996, at Al.
495. William Neuman, NAACP to TargetGun Industry in Lawsuit, N.Y. POST, July 13, 1999,
at 016.
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or comfort from the community. 49 6 In addition, damage awards help
accident victims to overcome their sense of outrage4 97 and provide a degree
of public accountability for violators. 498 Nevertheless, there is something
disturbing about allowing the legal tort system to be used to advance the
political or ideological agendas of special interests. The prospect of
"vigilante litigation" is particularly unsettling when special interest groups
are allowed to pursue a vendetta against media defendants. Limiting the
liability of media publishers will make it more difficult for such groups to
use the tort system as a weapon against the media.
3. Imposition of Responsibility on Criminal Actors
Finally, restricting lawsuits against media publishers will uphold the
principle of personal responsibility. Allowing plaintiffs to sue media
defendants arguably deflects public attention away from teenage killers and
shifts it to parties who have no direct connection with the plaintiff's injury.
To be sure, violent video games and pornographic Web sites, along with
guns, bad parenting, inattentive teachers, and insensitive classmates all
play a role in producing teenage killers, but ultimately the individual who
commits the crime must be held accountable. Expanding the list of
defendants in a tort action diffuses moral responsibility for criminal
behavior rather than focusing on the individual who is primarily
responsible. Consequently, plaintiffs should not be permitted to cast their
nets too far.
CONCLUSION

The personal representatives of three of the schoolchildren murdered
by Michael Carneal have brought suit against a group of moviemakers,
496. See Peter A. Bell, Analyzing Tort Law: The FlawedPromise of Neocontract,74 MINN.
L. REv. 1177, 1218 (1990) (declaring that "[t]his opportunity to speak and be heard about personal

tragedy may be the most important feature oftort for accident victims, more important in some ways
than obtaining monetary compensation"); Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the
Liability Crisis,Mass Torts, Power,and Responsibilities,1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 862 (arguing that
"[t]ort litigation provides a place for victims to tell their stories to the public and make the
perpetrators listen").
497. See Stanley Ingber, Rethinking IntangibleInjuries:A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALL. REV.
772, 781 (1985) (contending that "[clompensation may restore the plaintiff's sense of self-value,
and erase his sense of outrage").
498. See Joseph W. Little, Up With Torts, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861,869 (1987) (observing
that accident victims "want accountability, which in a civilized society means access to a forum and
a set of rules by which they may publicly prove themselves right and someone else wrong"); see
also Timothy D. Lytton, Responsibilityfor Human Suffering: Awareness, Participation,and the
Frontiersof Tort Law, 78 CORNELLL. REV. 470, 504 (1993) (observing that "[t]ort law not only
remedies injustice by imposing damage awards, it also exposes normative features of relations
between parties by articulating and applying conceptions of responsibility").
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video game manufacturers and Web site owners, claiming that these media
defendants encouraged or inspired Cameal to kill his classmates. Although
the plaintiffs are seeking $130 million, the avowed purpose of the suit is
not only to obtain compensation for the victims' injuries, but also to force
media defendants to change the content of the material that they
disseminate to the public. While this objective is no doubt wellintentioned, if lawsuits like this are successful, their ultimate effect will be
to greatly reduce the variety of material that is made available to adult
audiences. Therefore, courts should resist the temptation to change existing
tort and constitutional doctrines in any way that encourages others to bring
these types of lawsuits against media defendants.

